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INTRODUCTION : ORIGINS OF PARLIAMENTIS INITIATIVE
The draft resoLution and action ptan draun up by the Speciat and Tempogary
Committee on European Economic Recovery is the resutt of severaI months of
rork, invotving severaI Partiamentary Coarmittecs and benefiting from the
assistance of outside experts, most notab[y ltlessrs ALBERT and BALL.
0n 30 September 1982 the enlarged Bureau asked five comnittee chairmen to
drau up a proposaI for preparing a report on European Econonic Recovery,
fotLoying an initiative taken by Sir Fred CATHERU0OD, chairman of the
Comnrittee on Externat Economic Retations.This decision of the'Bureau rras
presented to the ptenary session on 12 october 19E2.
The group of cornmittee chairmen, knoy as the Economic Recovery Group, was
entarged and chaired by Vice-Pr6sident NIKOLAOU and uas composed of :
Sir Fred CATHERI,OOO, Chairman of the Committee on ExternaI Economic ReLat'ions,
Mr Jacques I{OREAU, Chairman of the Comnittee on Economic and'Monetary Affairs,
slrs Hanna WALZ, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Research,
trlr Pancrazio DE PASOUALE, Chairman of the Comrnittee on Regionat PoLicy and
RegionaI PLanning, ttlr Michet PONIATOIISKI, Chairman of the Comnitte€ on
Development and Cooperation and Mr Efstratios PAPAEFSTRATI0U, Chairman of
the Committee on SociaL Affairs and Emptoyment.
0n 12 January 19E3 the Group decided to appoint l,lr t{ichet ALBERT,
former "Comn'issaire au p[an" and Professor James BALL, Director of
the London Business SchooL to draft a report. The Group atso
asked Dr Johannes t'lITTEVEEN, Professor Luigi SPAVENTA and
Dr Utf LANTZKE to contribute on specific points (monetary affairs,
regionat poticy and energy respectiveIy). The experts consuLted
t.idety uith ministers, centrat bank officiaLs, econonic and monetary
experts, officiats in the Member States and officiats of inter-
nationaI organisations. The report, signed by ilessrs ALBERT/BALL, ras
finalised on 30 June 1963 and presented to Partiament and the press
during the JuLy pert-session in Strasbourg.
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0n 6 JuLy 1983 the Bureau decided to submit to plenary, in accordance
yith Rute 91, a motion for a reso[ution to create a tenporary special
conmittee of 39 members, including members of the six cornnittees con-
cerned, rith a bureau cornposed of the six committee chairnen, charged
yith drafting a report on Europcan economic revivat. It tas anended
in orddr tO-attbi, th€ .inctirSion- of menrbcrs of the Comfilttee'-oh-Agri-
cutture, araking a totaL of 42 menbers, and adopted on 15 September
1983.
The committee heLd its constituent meeting on 26 October 19E3. It
etected f'lr I|IOREAU as chairman, Mr DELEAU as vice-chairnan and
Itlr HERfttAN as rapporteur.
The committee organised hearings on the ALBERT-BALL report and on
other proposats for economic recovery rith t{r THQRN, President of the
Commission; tlr ORTOLI and ttr DAVIGN0N, Vice-Presidents of the Com-
mi ssion; I'lr ALBERT; Mr DREW, assi stant to !!r BALL; t{r CEYRAC,
President of the Economic and SociaI Committee; Professor WITTEVEEN,
former Director of the IMF; ftlr CARLI, President of UNICE; Mr DEBUNNE,
President of ETUC; Irlr DELORS, President-in-Office of the CounciL;
llr LE PoRTZ, President of the European Investnent Bank; f'lcssrs
HENDERSoN and HIGGINS, 0ECDi rilr LANTZKE, InternationaL Energy Agency and
l.lr Pierre URI.
0n the U..i. of these hearings and the detaiLed discussions on the
uorking documents and draft report presented by the rapporteur, the
comnittee adopted the draft reso[ution and recovery pLan on 1 March
1 9E4.
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A. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ALBERT/BALL DIAGNOSIS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS
1. Any sotution to the probtcms current[y facing the Community must be based on
an accurate diagnosis of the cause of the retative decLine of the Community
vis-a-vis thc other industria[izcd countries of the rorLd. Agreement on the
diagnosis ought to [cad to agreement on the cure. 0n the latter, hoyever,
Itlr Atbert and Professor Eatt erc not entlrrly at one.
2. Atthough the ideas put foruard by l{r Atbert have an attractive air of
bri[liance and tucidity, it is generalLy fett that they are meant to be
iItustrative rather than conprehensive. tlithout ctaiming to present an in-
depth analysis of the probtems - it youtd take voLumes - our committee has
nonetheLess endeavoured to broaden the scope of the survey by briefty assess-
ing the outcomc of the economic policies pursued in a number of indr.jstriaLized
countries outside the Community and by questioning a dozen or so experts on
most of the points at issue.
3. Thc main themes of the ALbert/BatL diagnosis may be sunorariaed as foLtows:
(a) Europe has sacrificed the future to the present by choosing to consume
rather than invest. Despite zero grouth, the fruits of grouth have
continued to be distributed. ReaL wages hav'e increased faster than pro-
ductivity, uith the resutt that company profits and, consequentty,
investment have suffered. This has been exacerbated by the fact that
fiscat and parafiscal charges, on top of uages, are the highest in the
nortd and have for ten years been rising more rapidty than anyuhere
etse.
Furthermore, pubtic investment expenditure has been cut back in favour
of consumption and socia[ yelfare expenditurc, uhich has continued to
increase tvice as fast as overaU. reaLth. ln 1982, pubtic authority
expenditure amounted to 50.82 of Community GDP, as opposcd to 352 in
the USA and 34.82 in Japan.
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(b) The reaction of the Community llembr States to this crisis has been one
of revery nan for hinsetfr. Instead of trying to vork together to find
cottective tEuropeanr sotutions to the probtems, the governments have
preferred to adopt a cornpetitive rather than a cooperative stance, so
that numerous neetings are spent in acrinonious negotiations over
reLativety iniignificant sums of mOney (it rnust be renenbered that the
total Comnunity budget is tess than 1Z of Community GDP and less than
?t of the sum of nationat pubtic expenditure), teaving no time or even
ui[|,ingness to consider the rider issue of cooperating to compete
efficientLy on the uortd market and puLL us out of the recession.
(c) It is not possibte for any trlenber state to rgo it atonerand attempt to
pursue an isoLated refLationary policy vhitst its partners are cither
defLating or adopting a'uait and see'approach. The econornies of the
Community are undeniabLy intertinked and any action must therefore be
a comoon ection. Up to now, there has been no joint response to the
crisis. Such comnon pol.icies as have been adopted have been piecemeaL
and insignificant.
(d) Hence, the outlook for the immediate future is not encouraging. The
probtem of unemployment wiLL become even more acute and the divergencies
betueen the economies of the Member States uitI become more marked. In
order to be ab[e to benefit from membership of a strong Community, each
country must first put its own house in order by controLLing inf[ation
and pubIic sector finances.
There have been no serious differences of opinion vithin our connittee on
the above diagnosis. Moreover, rith the exception of tttr Debunne, none of
the experts heard took issue yith the ALbert/BaLt anaLysis, at teast as far
as its diagnostic section is concerned.
Even so, there xere differences of enrphasis. Some experts feLt that
infLation and monetary instabitity were chiefty to btame for the crisis.
Others singted out the Loss of ground in technotogicaL deveLopment and the
compartmentatization of the markets. 0thers again attached particutar
5.
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importance to the lorer return on investnent conseguent upon the escaLation
of rage costs, heavier taxation and the erpansion of sociaI yelfare
provisions. There ras, houever, unanimity on tuo points: insufficient
irwestment and an insufficient European tprescncer.
6. Three probterns are scarcety touched upon in the rdiagnosist and deserve to
be tooked at a titt[e more fulty:
(a) The internationaL environnent
7. The European economy is more susceptibte to externat influences than
either the Anerican or the Japanese economy. Consequentty, events in the
rest of the uortd have a more pronounced impact on grouth and employment
rates in Europe than anyuhere else. ]lonetary instabitity, the indebtedness
of the Third tJortd, high interest rates and increases in the,'prices of oiL
and rav materiats atL tend to obstruct productive activity or to bLunt the
impact of the economic poticies pursued.
8. ALthough Europe's politicat pohrer and inftuence ortthe internationaL scene
are incommensurate uith its economic inportance, by strengthening poLiticaL
cooperation betveen the Member States it cou[d do nore, uith Japan and the
United States, to coordinate budgetary, monetary and trade poLicies yith a
viey to achieving greater stabitity and predictabiLity.
9. This is nhy our committee bctieved it necessary to incl,ude an entire chapter
on internationaI cooperation in its reeovery pLan.
(b) Demographic pressures and labour force behaviour must aIso be taken in-
to consideration
10. The rapid rate of increase in the working popu[ation - far more rapid than
the expansion of the poputation as a uhote - has been and uitt continue to
be a major inf[uence on the Levet of unenployment. Each year, about a
nitLion extra jobs woutd have to be created to maintain empLoyment at
existing teveLs.
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11. Two factors can be identified as being the most important inftuences cn
tabour infLor: the baby-boom effect and femate Iabour force participation.
The behaviour of inftors into uorking age popuLation represents of course
onty haLf the story. The totat demographic impact on labour markets uiIL
be the conbined effect of inftovs and outfLows.
Tabte 1 shors for the ten Community countries the potentiat !g!!gg
poputation and the particutarty probLematicat ryouthr poputation up to
1995. It can be seen that in att countries the poputation of vorking age
ri[t increase up to 1985. For the fottoiwng five years the position is
more diversified but in three of the four targest llember States (France,
Ital.y and the United Kingdom) the potentiaI uorkforce witt continue to
increase. In the period 1990-1995. the potentiaL working poputation
shows a decLine in aLL countries except Iretand and Denmark. For the ryouthr
popu[ation, the recent dectine in the birth rate HiLt be felt in atL
countries, except Iretand, bY 1990.
t;1hiLe it is retativety easy to be assertive about the size of demographic
pressures during the 
.decade ahead (aside from migratory movements), it is
much more difficuLt to forecast Labour force behaviour. Future schoot
enrolment is uncertain, partLy because there may be a grotring trend to com-
bine schooting urith gainfut work. Future retirement trends are atso diffi-
cutt to predict ouing to the effects of votuntary or compuLsory early
retirement schenes. But even more unpredictabLe appears to be the future
tabour force participation of Homen. If anything, it must be assumeo that
past trends of rising fema[e Labour force participation viLL continue. In
fact, during a recent OECD High LeveL Conference on the Rote of trlonen in the
Economyr 0ECD governments agreed to seek to improve the enpLoyment chances
of tromen regardtess of prevaiLing [abour market conditions.
14. Tabte 2 shoys the resutts for 6 Community countries for uhich nationat fore-
casts of tabour force grouth are avaiLabLe. A deceIeration of Labour force
grorth in the tate 1980s uiLL occur in most countries but Labour force
participation is stiLL expected to exert a positive inftuence on labour
force grolrth. By far the most important contribution to future Labour force
grouth ritt be, as in the past, the rise in uorking age popuLation. Never-
thetess, for the 0ECD area as a whote, no dramatic reduction of suppty side
pressure on the Labour market is to be expected in the 19E0s. The future
development of individuat working time wiLL aIso be reLevant to unemptoyment.
In fact, the forecast reLative strong growth of the labour force may be
misteading in the sense that many newcomers to the Labour markei wiLL be
tooking for [ess than futL-time or Less than fut[-year-round jobs. Houever,
1?.
13.
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no ?!tirbIc forrcrit of thc uor\ing rimc dirnension of Iabour suppt]
ir avritrbte. Ptrt-tlrrc jobr for narritd vonen, for instrnce, nay
bc a significrnt devetopncnt in ronc countrics, but in others there
is evidancc th.t rith riring CducttionaI rt.trinncnts uomQn are in-
crcrsingLy recking fuLl,-tloc jobs. lndividuat rorking tiac is one
of thc cruelrt vrriebtcr uhich nry bc rtfcctcd by poticy to batenccfuturl trbour nlrlttt.
Tabtc 2
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Sourccg: Labour Forcc StatiSticsr 0ECD, P9r'is; Denographic Trends
1950-1990, 0ECD, Plrit, 1979; rnct nltionrI participation
rrtc proj cc t i onr
15. It choutd be pointcd out thrt thc abovc country projcctions vere
catcutrted by thc 0ECD in 1979. iorC recGntty (June 19E3) the Eurqgqs6
Conrrission hrt .ttcrilptGd to projrct thG glgbf! Comauniry participation?!tc and thc conscqucnt unaoptoyncnt rrte in thc coning decade. tts
tatcst forccrsts prcdict r gglggllgO ln the p.rticipation rate from 66.4I
of thc pogulrtion of rorking rgc in 19E2 to 65.5: in 19E4, the touest
rete cve? rcgi:tcred since 1953, ihit yitt frLt furthcr to 65.1I in 1985,fottorcd by r rrrrtt progrcsrivc incrca:c of about 0.11 per y?ar fron 19E6
to 1990r llur ttre 19E4 Lavol ull,l, br rrrchcd r9rin.
Thc abovc grojcction3, talen togethe? rlth thc currcnt econonic forecasts,
iapty thrt rrncnptoyncnt rltt !f!! by 1990 to 10.6t ot thc rcrling poputa-tioa, rgcinrt r predictcd 11.31 for 19E4.
Evcn in thc untikcty cvent that productivity rnd eaptoynent trends r?turned,fror l9Ei onrtrdt, to thoio ol 1953-1962 (productivity grouth of 4.lrl p.a.
rnd c;ptoyDrnt g?orth of 0.6I g.!.)r togsthr rith r strbitizetion of tnegrrtlclgrtion rrtr.t 65I, thrrc rculd f!!!! bG.n unerptoynent rate oft.2l in l99O 1.
1 S." PE 8?.g?5, pages g to 1i
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16. In the Light of the foregoing, one conctusion is inescapabLe: the measures
adopted or to be adopted to cut back the suppLy of manporer and retieve
the strain on the Labour market have to be reversibte. After 1990, and
particutarLy after 1995, demographic trends uiLI change direction and in-
fluence the Labourmarkct in such a uay that the supply of labour couLd
once again be instrumentat in curbing grorth.
(c)@
17. lrlr Albert and Mr BatL assert that the
aLL, resistance to cuts in uage costs
increasing unemptoyrnent.
high teveL of uage rosts and, above
have been ctearLy instrumentaL in
18. Not surprisingty, the trade union organizations dispute this assertion.
iloreover, it rlas apparent from the discussion of solutioas yithin our
comnittee that, atthough they had no quarreL uith the A,[bert/BaIL diagnosis
as a whote, severat members had doubts about the Commission's proposaLs on
wage restraint.
19. ttlany statisticat data have been used to support the arguments of those Hho
disagree on this issue.
20. It is necessary here to ctear up the confusion which frequentLy arises rhen
econonists come to assess the reLationship betyeen uage costs, empLoyment
and productivity.
21. Most of the statistics provided by the Conrnission are based on the concept of
unit tabour costs. ll, however, the purpose is to assess the impact of
Labour costs on emptoyment, the concept is misLeading.
22. As the rise in uage costs prompts undertakings to rationatize, or forces
the cLosure of marginaI undertakings through bankruptcy, the productivity of
the Labour factor, measured by sector, tends to inprove. Unit tabour costs
do not rise, and they may even fa[1, each time there is an increase in the
teveL of unemptoyment. Using sector productivity as the accepted yardstick
for increasing wage costs couLd, if the argument Has taken to its extreme,
utLimateLy justify wage increases vhich rouLd force atL the undertakings of
a given sector out of business, except for the most efficient.
- 11 - PE 88.7941fin./B
?3. The method used by tttr ALbert and Mr BaLt, rhich consists of measuring the
discrepancy betueen the gronth of per capita real wages and the grouth of
GDP in voLune per person emptoyed, is certainLy more acceptabte.
24. This method is itLustrated by the fot[ouing tabte:
Discrepancy betueen
per capita reat uages
and per capita reaL GDP
Average 1961-1970
1973
1975
1978
1 9E0
1 983
European
Communi ty
100
1 06.4
114
112
113
116.8
USA
100
103.3
106,5
105 .4
106.8
109.2
J epan
100
100.7
107.2
104.?
9E.7
97.9
25. The fLex'ibil.ity rhich has permitted a dovnward movement of real Hage costs
'in the USA, Japan, Austria and SuitzerLand and the contrasting rigidity which
has prevaiLed in Belgium, France and Itaty rouLd seem to Lend credence to
A[bert and BaLLrs arguments.
?6. It is a[so striking that the rise in unemptoyment has been arrested in
atmost atL countries in which it has been possib[e to freeze or reduce real
Hage costs first. No one would dispute that many other factors have a
bearing on the expLanation of unempLoyment. Just as [ack of competitiveness
may equat[y resutt from draconian fiscaL measures, a total [oss of
entrepreneuriaI drive or reak financiat structures, so a rise in unemptoyment
may atso resuLt from a change in the rorking popuLation or a tack of
occupationaL or geographicaL mobi Lity.
- 1? - PE 8E.7911f in./B
2?. It seems certain that increases in real rages in Europe since 1973 have
encouraged entrepreneurs to invest in more capitat intensive production
methods thereby increasing productivity rhi[e permanent[y destroying jobs.
In the US, on the other hand, in six of the Last ten years reat uages have
actuatLy fatten in response to narket pressures so that the incentive for
US entrepreneurs to repLace tabour uith capitaI has been considerabty tess.
The avaitabitity of an ever-grouing tabour force in the United States,
combined nith tess restrictive labour tegistation and tess attractive sociat
security benefits than exist in Europe, has created a fLexibLe Labour market
in rhich even nominaL Hages can move downvards in response to market
conditions. Such a situation has also encouraged the development of a Large
and growing service sector $61 of emptoyment as against 552 in the Conrmunity)
based on the emptoyment of unskilLed tabour at reLatively Lou rages.
The net effect of these structura[ differences in the Labour markets of the
Community and the United States has been that since 1973 the US has created
20 miLlion Bgl jobs whiLe in Europe there are 3 miLtion lgfgC jobs than
ten years ago.
-13- PE 88.7941fin./B
B. THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THIRD
?g. AtL the countries of the uorLd, and the industria[ized countries in
particuLar, have been affected by the co[Lapse of the internationat monetary
system set up at Bretton bloods and by the tuo consecutive oit shocks'
?g. ALthough the degree of openness, and hence vuLnerabiLity to externat
pressures, varies from one country to another, and aLthough potiticat situa-
tions and economic structures are rareLy comparabte from one continent to
another, the committee found it instructive to study the broad tines of the
adjustment strategies pursued by governments and the resuIts achieved,
especiaLLy in terms of growth and empLoyment.
30. In the interests of brevity, ue Limited the scope of this study to those
countries which have achieved, or appear to have achieved, above-average
empLoyment LeveLs. These are:
- SwitzerLand
- Sueden
- Austria
- JaPan
- thE USA
- Taiwan
- South Korea
- 14 - PE 88.7941fin./B
Switzerland
The economic poLicy of Svit:erLand during recent years has shown a re-
markabte degree of adaptabiLity and constancy in fotLor.ing certain basic
aims.
?. EggggigI1_pgligy aims at nedium-:erm equitibriun of the finances of the
Confederation. BuCAet c:ficits .;ere reiuced str:ngty by 1982, peraiiting
a cautious expans'icnary fiscaL poLicy in 19E3 (increase of pubLic spending
of about 0.8% ot GNP).
Decreasec external- demar: anc ari appreciStion o'i:he exchange rate Cue
:o Loi in;Laticn resuL:::'in a:=.1 of ex30rts i":1982 and 1983.
Sw'i tzer'.and's :c:nom'i c s.lc:3ss ur::'i L tocay can 33 attrioutso io ti'le
foLLowing factors: iis:=L (bucga:ary) ano mone:=ry poLicies nave been
charac:eri sed by a grea: :egree 2i siab':'-':iy, an: :ne contrcL of inf taticn
has been pursuecj steadit'/ and pe!'"anentty, due .;n 3reat part to the high
degree of autonc:,,ry and:::e prest'i ge of :Ie Syiss llationat Bank. This
creares a favouraoLe ec:ncaic c'.:nate anc aenera::s favcurabIe expectaticns
cn eccncnic prospeCtS, ::'la! cenE?r argung future prgspec!ive Stabitity.
Th'is again makes the ef':rts of:ne government::rards stabiLity eas'ier
to attain. SwiizerLano seens tc ae a cLassic c:s3 of positive "se[f
fuLfiLLing prophecies" and a vir:uous ecsnomic c7cl.e-
lgnglgfZ_eglj.gI aims at keeping infLation [ou and
poss'ibte exchange rate ftuctuations by observing a
money expansion. t|lonetary poticy vas restrictive
retaxed in 1982, resuLting in Iorier interest ratss
that Has occuring internationaLLy.
reducing as far as
monetarist ruLe for
in 19E0-1981 and vas
to a greater extent
quite fas: to the neu economic
:easures cf adaotation but did
'initia::'re. Sriss products re-
:he SF a:preciated considerabLY.
Suitzertand has been abi.e atso ic adapt
situation. The government has pic,notec
not try to substitute for'=rivate
,rained reLativeLy compe:it'i ve, atthough
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This is due to the speciat cLirnate existing in the Suiss labour market
that is characterised by moderate demands from the trade unions and the
Labour fOrCe in generat, as ueLt as an important margin of manoeuver due
to the existence of foreign uorkers. lJage demands and settLements vere
moderate, so that one couLd speak of the existence of votuntary incomes
poticy, uhite productivity groyth remained retativety high, so that Swiss
products remained in many cases competitive even taking into account the
appreciation of the SF.
Unemp[oyment remained Loul aLso due to measures to reduce the foreign
norking forc.e in SuitzerLand.
Adaptation was further faci Litated by the incentives given to encourage
industriaL redeployment to more capitaL and higher cc]n<itogy sectors, as
veLL as incentives to encourage research and professionat training. (1)
Sueden
The Suedish economy is aLso an open economy rlhere exports and imports ptay
a significant part in GNP and consumption, the export share in output
reachi ng 28.7i! for the periocj 1977'79. The pubLic sector's re"'enue share
in GDP had increased to 50.8?i during:he same Seriod ancj the average tax
rate, which has CoubLed ove!'ine Last:';enty five yearS, was prcbabty the
h':gnest in the'rorLd.
A high priority has a[uays'ceen attacied to the futI employment:arget.
Sredish econom'ic poLicy after the war comb'inei this tong-run aim rith
trying to controL cycLicaL fLuctuations by concining seLective and generaL
measures. SeLectivity has aLsO been a charac:eristic feature of nonetary
poLicy, as the authorities have sttenicted to inftuence not onLy ihe totai
voLume of credits, but atso'its distribution. Though ihe ocenness of the
eccnomy has naturatLy affected the rocm f6r manoeuvre, batance cf peyments
probLer:rs have onty On a feu cccaSions Led tO a change in the orientaticn
of poLicies. AIso, the Sweciish authorities, untike the other Scandinavian
countries, have nOt appLied 'i ncomeS poLi cieS in a fOrrnat sense, aLtirough
centraLised bargaining and c'.ose cooperation betueen ihe government and
the Labour market parties have frequentty procuced resuIts uhich in the
other Scandinavian ccuntries iJere achieveC thrcugh more'format arrangemeniS'
(1)tft" 
statiSt'i cs nOted here are taken f rom 0ECD's econom'i c stuCies,
SwitzerLand May 1983.
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In Sueden changes in primary reserves and reserve requirements have been
the principaI instruments in regutating overaLI credit suppty. Over time,
interest rate variations have become more frequent, but various setective
measures favouring priority sectors have aIso gained in importance.
During the period 1974-80 Sreden fotLoged a poticy of generat demand stimutus,
employment suppporting measures and setective poticies in favour of seak
industries. Labour narket measures Here oost extensivety used and by 1977'78
4 to 4.51 ot..the Labour force Has enrottgO i1 pubLic relief uork and training
schemes, uith an additional 2 to 2.5r estioated to have been',under-
employed" uithin the private sector. This resutted in retativety high
grouth rates and virtuaLLy fulL employment but atso in a marked dete-
rioration in internationat conpetitiveness, refIecting some acceLeration
in nominaI wage increases, a sharp decLine in productivity gains, and
an effective appreciation of the exchange rate due to the "hard currency
option" initiaLLy adopted by the authorities. Reat uages moved in tine
vith the virtuaLty ftat trend in reaL rationaL income and nominal wage
increases uere comparat'ivety moderate. llevertheLess, since the moderation
'Jas partLy due to compensatory income tax reductions, uhich, in turn,
rere financed by higher payrolL taxes, Hage costs rose considerabLy faster
than earnings and the 'imorovement 'in internationat competitiveness achievec
cluring 1970-7t ras ou'i ckLy eLiminatec. L'lhen eccnom'i c poLicy became more
restrictive in 1977, output felL by ?.5'l and due to a simuLtaneous depre-
ciation and reductions in sociaI charges and payroiL taxes, the oeterioraticn
in competitiveness ',ras sharpty reversed. Houever, there have recentty been
indications of grouing sociat unrest, pointing to suppressed infLat.ionary
pressures and the risk of a renewed riciening of imbaLances.
Swedish eccnomic poLicy has met rith mixed success. UnempLoyrnent uas
Louer than in mosi industriaLised countries, but ihis success resutted
in heavy economic costs in other areas. As the OECD points out, structuraL
disequi Libria have appeared and increased recentLy in the Syedish econony.
GDP growth increased more sLowLy in Sneden than in srost 0ECD countries
and in particuLar industriat production and productivity feLL back in re-
tation to the other OECD countries. The situation of pubtic finance also
deteriorated sharcty and the externat deficit, aLthough not so'important
as in some other countries, is stitL a constraint. Suedish exports of
industriaL products increased much mcre sLouLy than the ueighted average
of the imports of the commerciaL oartners of Sireden. Thjs implies a se-
rious Loss of market share ano of competitiveness of Swedish products.
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The main reason for this toss of competitiveness and stor-Coun of groiJth
seen to be the decrease of investnrent, as in most European countries.
This is again due in great part (aLso according to the OECD) to a decrease
of profitabiLity of enterprises. The share of profits in vaLue adde.d of
industry feLL by 102 from the beginning of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s
(1960 share: about 31'A, 1980 about 232, congared to Japan of 542 lo 447.'
west Germany 4?7 to 302, Canada 342 to 362, USA ?61 to 242 lor thc same
period. Except for the USA and Canada, uhere the profit share remained
atmost constant, profit shares feLL in most OECD countries, but actuaL pro-
fit shares [.ie above the Svedish one). (1)
Aust ri a
The main thrust ef At.tstri*r economic poLicy has been to tinit
unempLoyment and to rely on a hard currency poticy p[us price controLs
to restrain inftationary pressures. In this Austria vas on the vhote
successfuL, achieving simuttaneousty a progressive reduciion of infLation
and a continued gro'rth of empLoyment. A necessary condition for the
success of this poLicy mix has been the nittingness of the tuo sides of
iniustry io accept a graciual rscuction in nominaL Hage claims and crofit
mar-oins without hav'i ng to be suojecteci io a proLcnged pe:''roo of sLack.
ihe resuLts achieved by Austria cear a favourabLe coogarison',iitj1 ilost
0EC) countries. UnempLoyment rsnains reLativeLy Lor, at:itough it has
increased since 1979 and infLation has decreased, due in 3reat oari to
a wage mcceration 6s wetL as price stabiLity. The current account'is
cLose to equiLibrium due to a tcv propens'ity to import.
(1)Sour..r: 
0ECD, !cononic Studies, Sveden, Juty 1982, oEcD, Eccnomic
OutLook, No 33, JuLy 1983, Patte Schetde Ancersen ancj Johny
AkerhoLn "scandinavia" in Andrea Bottho, ed. "The European
Economy, Growth and Crisis", 0xford UP, 1982, John T. Addison,
"Incomes PoLicy: The Recent European Experience", in
J. L. FatLick, R. F. ELLiott, "Incomes Poticies, Inftation anc
ReLatiue Pay", George AtLen and Unwin, Londcn 1981. For a
theoreticaL approacn to the retation betr,.een empLoyment, invest-
ment and prcf itabi Lity see ECmond MaLinvaud "',,lages and UnemoLcy-
ment", in Econom'ic Journat, itlarch 19E2.
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1- FiscaL Poticy: Fiscat poLicy xas restrictive untiL 1981 aiming at the
reduction of pubLic deficits but became more expansionary after 1981 with
a viev of reducing unemployment, uhiLe end of 1982 a programme to promote
emptoyment, incLuding medium-tcrn mrasures of structurat adiustnent, has
been introduced.
2- t'lonetary Po[icy: The Austrian Centrat Bank is fotLouing a monetary
regine not in monetary expansion but in tergrting the cxchange rate of
the schiLLing. rn fact, the schiU.ing is ctosety fottoning the DI{, due
to the importance of Germany as a commercirt partnrr, as an cxport market
and for tourisn. Austrian interest rates also closcl.y folton those in
Gernany 'in orcer to avoid an excessive capitat outftor that woutd resutt
in the case of significant intercst rates differentiats. t{onetary devetop-
ments (and monctary expansior0 therefore cLosety fol.tored the German pattern.
3. Incomes Poticy: This instrument has been used consiantLy by Austrian
economic poIicy and its importance has further increased due to rising
unemotoyment. The objective is to foLtou rage developments in Germany,
so tflat, in retation to the exchange rate targltting, the competitive po-
sition v'is-a-vis Germany does not deteriorate. !!oreover, taking into
account that ine Ausirian inftation rate does not diffcr from the German
one, it is cLear thar any diiference in wages routd affect profits. If
Hages',.ere to riSe faSter than in Germany, either cOmoetitiveneSS uouLd
detsriorate, or profit margins rouLd have to be ccmpressed, which again
routc infLuence invesremcnt negativeLy.
4. EnoLoyment: Thc Lou unemotoyment rates observed cluring 1960-80 can
be expLained 'in part oy favourabLe demographic cevetopments. Astive popu-
[aticn groHth curing rh'is period ras o.z5z per year, as comoared to an
average of 1.ZiZ tor:he 0EC). RecentLy this trend has been reversed and
act-ive poputa:'ion grcuth ui LL increase for the next 15 years, rising at
about 0.75x' p.a. untit 1985. unemptoyment coutd rise due to this, even
if rorking hours are reduced, as Has the case during the 1970s. But even
if the reduction of rorking iirne could safeguard cxisting jobs it is doubt-
fuL it coutd increase iotaI empLoyment. ALso, reouction of working time
must be undertaken in such a ray as not to Horsen Austria's internationaL
conpeiitive pos;tion. (1 )
(1)S"" 
OECD, Eccnomic Studies, Austria February 1983,08CD Economic outLook No JI,
.luty,'983
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J apan
Under the difficult internationaL circumstances of the tast years, thc
performance of the Japanese economy has been good by internationat standards.
Progress achieved in the fight against inftation has been remarkabLe,
urith a further dece[eration of atl measures of price increases to the [ouest
rates in the OECD area. Econornic arouth (at about 3Z) has remained highcr
than in any of the larger llember countries, a devetopoent accoatpanied by
a ctear ioprovenent in the pattern of grouth, rith stronger doacstic deoand
accounting .or most of the rise in output. The erternal position has reauincd
strong and further structuraI adjustment in industry has taken Place.
But stiLt the Japanese economy has also faced some probtems. By historicet
standards eccnomic arouth has been stov and much touer than initiat[y er-
pected by the authorities. The steady deceleration of reaL GNP grouth since
1980 has continued and ted to a significant reakening of tabour market con-
ditions. Al.though contributing to supporting the economy, continuing
targc budget deficits have put substantiat upuard pre3sure on debt l:rvice
chargcs. Uith intcrcst payments rising rapid[y and nou accounting for one
sirth of totat Ccntrat government GeneraI Account expenditurer this trend
hrs nadr the necessary reduction in the targc structuraL fiseat deficit
even harder to achieve.
1. Fiscat Pcticv: iiscaI PoLicy since 1980 has been doninated by concern
abour Large pubLic srctor deficits and the nounting votune of public debt.
FiscaI poticy's rooflr of manoeuvre',Jas constrained by the targe structurat
budgct deficit and the officiaL medium-term objective of etininating thc
deficit financing of current expenditure.
The present aacro-eccnomic situation (vcry tou inftation, a lrrgc rnd rising
current account supturs, ueak domestic dernand and ampte private savings in
retation to government financiat needs) uoutd normatty caLt for ilore expansionar;
fiscat poticz. But this poticy has to be vieyed against the nGed to reduce
the Dudget cefict over the medium term. The actuaL gcnerat governncnt deficit
that is around 1l oi GNP is not particu[arty [arge in relation to rhat
of cther OEC) econoaies but its structuraI cooponent, about 3/4 of thc
totEL, is re[ativeLT hi9h. In reLation to GilP th? stock of outstanding
government debt has risen very rapidty over thc last decade to ye[t abovc
the average of other Large countries,'eith interest payments accounting
for nost of thc structuraL deficit. strong upHard preEsures on the de-
ficit are exrected tc deveLop as from the Late 1980s, as the rapid aging
of:he pcpuIation riLL reduce and e,rentuaLty reverse the current substantiaI
surptus of the Sociat Security account. This re'inforces the need for tackIing
the targe deficit of the centrat government given notabty the risk of putting
pressure on interest rates.
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?. Flonetary ooticy: The overatL suppLy of credit has.enained reLativety
easy, but the authorities have refrained from reducing the official' dis-
count rate because of fears of veakening the yen. flost of the reduction
in overseas rates has been reflected in a narrouing of interest
rate differentiaLs, white the dectine in domestic short and tong-run
interest rates has been very timited. Given the marked improvement
of infLationary trends and expectations, reaI interest rates have re-
mained at historicaL[y high Levets.
The combination of the high teveL of real interes! rates.and thc retative
ueakness of the yen has thus created a conflict betyeen the domest,ic and
externaL objectives of monetary poLicy (i.e..louer interest rates uouLd
facititate domestic expansion and a reduction of the pubtic deficit, but
voutd, through 'increased capitaI outfLous, weaken further the yen).
3. EnrpLoyment and incomes poLicy: Japan has achieved favourabte resuLts,
having Low.unemptoyment and rage moderation combined uith high producti-
vity and comoetitiveness. This is targety due to the Japanese mentaLi:y
and outLook. The gnterprise is regarded as a "fight.ing unit,,, uhere
great votuntary discipIine prevaiLs, and aLso as a community uhere some
Cecisions are taken cotLectivety, uhere most peooLe are emptoyed for Life
and where prornot'i on is usuatLy 5y sen'i ority. The Loyatty of the empLoyeo
ic'darcs rhe enterprise is very strong. EccnomicaILy this neans ihat J6-
panese iorkers take fewer hoLicays than in the USA anc 3urope,:o such
a ciegree that the days:aken oif 
'eork amount to about one thircj of an
emoLoyed person's entitLement. Absenteeisn is aLso nu., Lor"r. (1)
tt q I
The USA is the best exampLe of a "success story" since 1980,
succeeding at the same iime io increase emp[oyraent (the onLy 0EC) ccuntry
ro do so in 1983), reduce infLation and achieve high grouth rates that
cear favourabLe ccmgarison, not onLy rith the Last three years (since 1979)
but aLso with other periods of reLative high growth. Furthermore, prospecis
for 19E4 and 1985 remain encouraging. StiLt, problems remain and if the
correct soLutions are not appLiedr grouth prospects,ray be endangered.
See 0ECD, Economic Surveys, Japan, JuLy 1983, OECD, Econonic OutLook,
No 33, JuLy 1983, Tominaga, Ken' ichi "Les organisations jaoonaises:
L'histoire contre Ie mythe", Takamiya, Susumu "La gestion japonaise
5 La crois6e ies chemins, Ishida, Hideo "Les conditions de travaiL au
Japon: Une comparaison avec L'Europe", dans "Le Japon mode ou moddLe"
Dossier R.F.G., No 27-28, septembre-octobre 19E0.
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1. Monetary Poticy: The Fed has fclLowed a cautious monetary poLicy of
quantitative money expansion in order to reduce inftation rapidty, in rhich
it succeeded. One of the main aims of this poLicy Has to inftuence [ong-
run expectations favourabty.
Z. Fiscat Poticy: During the Last years, the {JSA folloved a poIicy of
strong fiscat expansion that came about through important tax cuts for
enterprises in order to favourabLy inftuence profitabil.ity (suppty side
economics) and increased expenditure, in particuIar for nititary purposes
that increased the government's demand (demardside economics of a Keynesian
nature). This resuLted in increased economic activity, faster growth and
Lower unempLoyment, but, combined vith the restrictive monetary poticy to
high budget deficits. This again resutted in high reaL interest rates, in
capitaL inftows to the USA, resuLting in doLlar appreciations, some toss of
competitiveness for American products and increasing trade deficits.
According to the President's Chief Economic Advisor, Prof. ll. FeLdstein,
the soLution to the pubtic deficits probLem shou[d come through a combination
of spending cuts and tax increases io be enacted norl but tc go into effect
in 1985.
3. incomes PoLicy: The American exoerience'rith incomes pcLicy is not
very positiver,.lith incomes poLicies ce'ing aoandoned after a ceriain period
of appticat'ion because they proveci to be'inefficient, the re3son for this
be'i ng: a) l{age and price determ'i naiion is more decentraIised in the USA
than is the case in the European eccnomies; b) The convent:cnaL macroeconomic
instruments of government poLrcy are cjispersed among differEnt arms of
government to a greater extenr than in European countrieS.
StiLL, rage moderation, coupted with rapid productiv'ity gains in i983,
ptayed a major part in the Arnerican recovery.
4. Productivity: in this area resuLts achieved in the USA, up to 19E2,
feLL betov those achieved in many !uropean countries. One exoLanation couLcj
be the increase in emp[oyment by the creation of about 10 miLLion adoitionaI
jobs in USA, whiLe emptoyment aLmost stagnated in Europe. ln 1983 the oro-
ductivity performance in the USA siarted increasing rapidLy, ehjle at the
same time emptoyment atso increasec.
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5. !{ernaL relations anc ba[ance of trade: ihe sirong CoLLar conrbined
vith the strong US recovery ted to increasing trade deficits, forecastec
to exceed t 70,000 miItion for 1983. Retative to the position of tuo rears
ago, in 1984 the USA wiIL:e provicing its trade partners yith a stirnulus
equivatent to more than 0.52 of the GNP of the rest of the uorld.
The strong doLtar has generated protectionist pressures in soar Anerican
sectors that suffer most from foreign competition.(1)
Ta i uan
Taiuan has achieved very high grorth rates during the 1970s and succeeded
in vithstanding the crisis retativety uett. Tainan is a case of yigorous
export led grorth, whi ch ras possibte due to the high competitiveness of
its products in some sectors.
1. l{onctary Poticy: InfL:tion is hcld to the [or teens, but some pressures
on inftation frorn higher energy prices titL 1980 and higher Hagcs have in-
creased it st'ightLy in 19EZ and 19E3. The-main aim of the governmentrs anti-
inf[ation poticy has been strict ccntroL of the money supp[y, rhiLe a mode-
rate Lioeratisation of imports of ;anufactured goods has also heLped to
restrain the prices of locatLy prccuced goods. ilonetary poticy foLLotrs [osety
the nonetary measures of T:iranrs :ain competitor, South Korea.
2. StructuraL PoL'i cy: S:-'.;c:ura'.:oLicy has aimed tiIL recentLy to acnieve
a h'ign cegree of industria.:sation, conclntrated in some key sectors, Like
isxtiLes, consumer eLectrc:':cs anc iood products. The internationaL ccrnpe-
t'itiveness of these sectors',ras gcc3, due to high productivity, high technica[
skiLL cf the Labour force 
=nd rrage;odcrationl. Some probLerns have appeared
recentLy due to a sLow-dor;'. in procuctivity and accetcration of wage increases.
The government is a'iming a: struc:'-rat change of the industriat base torards
more high technoLogy indus::ics, as etectronics, precision instrunents and
sophi s:icated rnateriaLs.
(1)S". John H. Fencave[ "T:? AmericEn Experience vith Incomes PoLicies" in
J.L. FaLLick and R. F. ilLiott'Incomes Poticies, Inflation and Retat'ive Pay"
op.cit., H. Giersch, F. ,jOLter "?orJards an explanation of the Productivity
SLoudown: An Acceteratic:1-DeceLe.ation Hypothesis" E.f . Denison "The
Interruption of Produc::uity sLc.doun in the uSA" and A. Lindbeck "The
Recent SLodOun Of Produc:ivity -irorth", aLL in EcOnOmiq Journat' No 93'
Marci 1983, Morgan Guar=:iae Tr'-si" Uorl.d FinanCiat trlarketS, the US Trade
Deficii and the DoLLar" lcicoer i983, CounciL of Economic AdviSers (chairaan
i,l . FeLdstein), "The US 'r the lic:'Ld Economy", in Economic Impact' No 63
a YEi/ ).
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South Korea
South Korea achieved high grotrth rates in the period 1961-1979 and became
one of the neu industriaIised countries.
The crisis hit the Korean economy hard (Gt{P fett by 6.2i in 1980) and
aLthough the situation ameLiorated in 1981-83 (intcrest rates dropped,
inflation yas reduced) it has been reatised that the crash of 1980 was
not onty due to the oit shock but to serious structural imbatances.
A change in the economic structure is necessa?Y, because the successfut
poticies of the 1970s had becone counterproductive by the beginning of
the 1980s. The government used their control of the financiaL systen to
channet credit to big businesses capabte of buitding nev ptants and factories
and shipping their products overseas quick[y. Hugc proiectsrsuch as shipyards
rerebuiLt in months, exports ba[tooneci and the econony grer in one rscord
year by 152. But high grouth was fot[ored by increased infLation. Invest-
ment had to be paid for by subsidised toans and vas therefore uastefut,
yhiLe competition betueen the big business groups compounded the Yaste.
SmaLl, companies, vhich might have been suppLying then, uere teft to yither
for tack of credit. Exporters bought suppties overseas instead, videning
the country's Large current overseas cjeficit and turning it into cne of
the biggest borrorers on internationaL capitaL market. ioreign investnent
was barred from some industries and barety vetcome in many others.
The probLem actuatLy seems to be a too h'igh degree of state interventionism
in the eccnomy. The state oUns some industries, inctuding public utiLities
and steet. But since it gets its way'rith private industryrmainty by
controILing the banking systen, ihe nev regimc's (GeneraL Chun re:Lacing
Park as the head of State after Park's assassination) canoaign tc give
private industry:he heLm in ihe country's devetopnent cecends mosi on
its success in freeing thc banks and caoitat narkets.
The Koreans had to Launch bi-o neri ndustries because tabour costs are in-
creasing steadiLy, the'ir manufacturing industry must increase its value acde
to compete overseas and to raise incones at home, and because of ihe need
to have factories capabLe of making'reapons to defend themseIves against
North Korea. But the probtem is conner-ied Hith the degree of seLf-suffi-
ciency that S. Korea shoutd a'im for, r:Lated to the cos! of this;oLic7.
Some industries can pay their way onLy if they can expot: as wet[ as serving
a timited home mar(et. ALL industries must be at least as compet':tive as
overseas rivaLs tc,nake import substiiution rrorth the high cost.
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South Korea has no choice but to abandon its [abour intensive industries
due to the rising Labour cost. (ALthough Korean labourers uork the Longest
hours Of any in the norld, average earnings in manufacturing have riSen
by 272 per year during 1978-19E1).
The poLicy fotloued in order to restructure the econony has three main
aims:
1. Import Liberatisation to increase the percentage of items uhich are
not on the banned tist from 777. to 902 by 1986-
2. Increase in direct foreign investment in order to attract capitat
anci new technoLogy.
3. Strengthening the financiaL and corporate section to make companies
more profitabte, less incLined to survive on Cebit anci more incLined to
increase their equity.
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Conc Lus i ons
31. With the exception of Sweden, uhose resuLts are, by and Large, the least
convincing, aLL the countries considered have achieved the same three
obj ect i ves:
(a) 9eo!rs!-ever-in!!e!ien
32. 5,1hite some of the countries considered, e.g. Sweden.and Austria, have
never experienced high rates of infLation, the others have succeeded, after
various fa[se starts, in soLving the probLem of escaLating costs. ALL have
pursued a reLativeLy strict monetary poLicy-
(b) FLexibi titv of reaL waqe costs
33. In the three Far Eastern countries considered, this fLexibiLity has been
achieved primariLy by means of the variabLe income component uhich is
Linked to company performance. In Austria and SwitzerLand, it has been
achieved through the maintenance of good Labour retations. In the United
States, it is more readity accepted than eLsewhere that the Labour market
functions Like any other market.
34. The fLexibiLity of hrage costs does not mereLy impinge on income LeveLs;
it aLso has a bearing on the spread of incomes and on the adjustment of
working hours.
( c ) Besci.ente!us-iodss!rie!-esgivi!x-!ererdg-!!s-sle!!h-ses!919
35. Whether encouraged by fiscaI incentives, interest rebates or subsidies, or
by the lack of opposition to the cessation or creation of productive
activities, conversion and redepIoyment have been achieved more sriftLy
than etsewhere and have escaped the sociat or po[iticat difficuLties so
often encountered in the countries of the Community.
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C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
36. Atthough there was retatively cLose agreement on the diagnosis, the debate
on appropriate sotutions reveated significant differences of opinion, not Least
betueen the tuo authors of the report rTorards European Economic Recovery in the
1980sr.
I. THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY lIR ALBERT AND MR BALL
{a) !gg1,s4s-90-EhiEh-lhsx-esreg
37. The tvo authors acknon[edge that grouth must be revived in order to reduce
unempLoyment, increase investment and its profitabitity, moderate uage
costs, reduce pubLic authority charges, strengthen the EMS, consoLidate
the common market, coordinate economic poticies, reduce our dependence on
externaL oit suppties, and eIaborate a Community industriaL poLicy.
38. They aLso agree that grouth couLd not by itseLf eliminate unemployment with-
in a short time span untess rates uere achieved which today woutd be
considered totaL Ly unreaListic.
(b) l{r BaLI maintains that the primary task is to recreate a cLimate and
conditions vhich are favourabte to investment. ltlarket forces uitL do the
rest. Hence his insistence that priority must be given to creating monetary
stabitity, cutting back fiscaL and parafisca[ [evies and decompartmentaLizing
the national markets. He refuses to beIieve that measures to stimutate
demand, especia[[y pubLic investment schemes, woutd have any Lasting impact.
He has no faith in incomes poLicies and price freezes, is extremety
scepticaL about the effectiveness of york-sharing schemes and has no
enthusiasm for the idea of imposing an oiL tax.
(c) Because he is auare of the difficuIties and the hardships imposed by macro-
economic adjustments and structuraI changes in the absence of growth,
because he fears that these adjustments might cause widespread defLation
and because he betieves in the possibiLity of reconciting a poLicy of incomes
restraint nith a poLicy for expanding demand based on pubtic investment,
Mr Albert proposes that the recovery shouLd be founcied on a combination of
three measures:
- ?7 - PE EE.794 ltin.lB
action to revive investment nith a view to increasing the grotrth rate
in the Community by 1Z; the additionaL investment needed for this pur-
pose b,outd be of the order of 151000 mitlion ECU and youtd be financed
from Community Loans. The cost of these toans voutd be reduced by means
of interest subsidies, which in turn vould be financed by a tevy on oiL
i mport s,
the creation of a European area for industry and research, and
the formutation of a European MarshatL plan for energy and research
PoLicy.
These measures rou[d be suppLemented by a speciaL programme designed to
bring greater fLexibitity to working conditions and working hours.
II. IEE.UIgU9.qE-IEE-EIESBI!
39. The response of the experts to the'diagnosisr uas one of quaLified approvat.
With the exception of Mr Debunne and Mr Uri, they endorsed the generaL content
of that part of the anatys'is on which Mr ALbert and l4r Bat[ were in ag'reement.
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1. Iayes!es!!i-Esrepe-!egs-Eehind
l4r Atbert pointed out that for a dozen years, consequent upon the first
oiI shock and the yortd recession, the prevaiLing trend in Europe had been to
negtect investment in favour of both private and pubtic consumption. Pub[ic
consumption, he noted, had increased at a faster pace than private consumption
thanks to the rapid expansion of the social security systems and the Uetfare
State.
Despite the stowcjovn of grouth, al.l. the European economies had preserved
the traditionaI patterns of income groxth.
Having opted for consumption and the status quo, having, in a rord, refused
to adapt, bre noH found that vhere investment - and especiat[y investment in the
key grouth sectors - Has concerned, He uere in a considerably Heaker position
than the United States and Japan.
2. lerllog-hsgcg
Given the rigidities inherent in our economies and, in particutar, the
rigidity of certain income structures, there couLd be no hope of restoringfuIt emptoyment in Europe unless the average rorking yeek was shortened.
It was undoubtedLy important to aim for as high a grouth rate as possible,
but encouragement shoutd aLso be given to locaL votuntary schemes to adjust
uorking hours, bearing in mind that it h,as neither desirabLe nor indeedpracticab[e to impose a shorter working treek in each and every sector of the
European economy.
3- Ilg-geoqtE!-EltelssY
Eecause it carried the idea of
the yord I redressementt (recovery)
on short-term patLiatives cou[d be
Eenerators of econonic activity.
a measure of permanence, [,lr Atbert preferred
to rretancer (boost or stinutus). Retying
no substitute for reactivating the main
It rtas essentiaL, theretore, to detiver a positive psychotogicat shock
rith a viey to changing the direction of the European economies.
t'lr ALbert's recommendation to the committee rras that recovery shoutd be
based not on consumption, but on investment; such investment shouLd be managed
at Community rather than at nationat LeveL and concentrated on projects of
common interest retating, for instance, to research and devetopment/ rhe grouthindustries, energy, and the development of the Less favoured Community regions
and the poor countries.
4.9eoslgslgos
Grouth in iso[ation tras impossibte and no country - not even the Federal
Republ.ic of Germany, the rnost powerfut country in Europe - coutd achieve groyth
rates vhich were substantiaIty and permanentLy higher than the rates achievedby its partners.
l'lr ALbert sau, that the committee had identified the nub of the problem.
The revival of grorth was indeed the key issue, but this had to be achieved for
the European economy as a whote. In other trords, no tlember State cou[C go it
aLone. It Has imperative that the peopLes of Europe shouLd be made aware that
Europe Has on the edge of catastrophe. I'f .:,'le European Partiament,ras unabLeto detiver the necessary satutary shock io'.ite citizens of Europe, there wouLdbe no way of avoiding a technoLogicat coLtapse thich wou[d create-an unempLoymentprobtem of far greater severity than that t.rhich ye h,ere experiencing today.
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Hearing with f{r DREIJ, Assistant to Professor BALL 16.11.83
frlr DREIJ undertined four key observations made in the ALBERT/BALL report.
The first is exchange rate stabitity and the importance of diatogue uith the
US uhose deficit and high interest rates are perhaps the most serious threat
to sustaining the recovery that is taking place. The second is the need to
restore a proper batance betueen fiscat and monetary poIicy together vith an
acceptable rate of inftation. The third is about creating the right economic
environment, uhich, if achieved, tritt atLor the economy to take off by itsetf.
This invotves changing economic and poLiticaL expectations, especiaL[y Labour
market expectations. The fourth point is for the Comnunity to take the last
vital steps to create a genuine internal market (see List of measures on
page 55 of the ALBERT/BALL report).
He drew attention to the shift from traditionat industry to the service
sector and to the use of nev technotogies uhich means that employment oppor-
tunities of the future vil.t be very different from those of the past. In
particu[ar, smaIt and meoium-sized undertakings are LikeLy to be predominant
in the creation of new jobs, aLthough it is stil.t the Large companies and the
nay in which they rork together that wiLt deve[op a European industriaI base.
In addition, Mr DREW pointed to Annex 6 of the ALBERT/BALL report chich
cat[s for the creation of an Ad Hoc Industry Committee facing the European
Partiament. This youtd enabLe Partiament to be informed directLy of the
needs of the industriaL sector.
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1. After expressing his support for Partiament's initiative, ltlr 0rtoLi
pointed out that the sotution to the employment probtems ciepended above aLL
on a poLicy for the devetopment of productive activity.
A macroeconomic frameuork uas needed for such a policy, in rhich measures
to reduce inftation uoutd ptay a predominant part. A clinate favourabte to
groulth couLd be created by monetary and budgetary poticies vhich xere mutuaLty
consistent and heLped to conbat inflationi in times of change, more than at any
other time, short-term measures had to be directed torards overcoming
structuraI probtems.
lulr OrtoLi expLaihed that an end to the crisis depended on action of three
k i nds:
(a) action to estabLish consistency betbreen the retevant nationaI poticies;
(b) action to ensure that Community measures took fuLI advantage of the
' continentat dimensionr; and
(c) action to guarantee that the Communityrs infLuence ulas used to
strengthen internationat cooperation.
2. The need for such action tlas nou generaIty accepted. Neverthetess, a
number of key questions stiLL had to be answered.
In the first place, uere macroeconomic poLicy and statutory and fiscat
measures sufficient to create the necessary cieveLopment structures? 0r ras
it necessary to go further anci, for instance, formutate a more directive
industriat poLicy?
Second, hotr were poLicies to enhance competitiveness and acceLerate
advanced technotogy and to be reconciLeci with the need to preserve socia[
harmony and cohesion?
Third, even if a stringent policy Here pursued, uoutd it be possibte to
put our budgets in order?
In ansuer to this tast question, Mr OrtoLi said that the present situation
required that the foLLowing conditions be met:
- budget management had to be seen to be credible;
- the l.ink betueen budgetary poLicy and monetary poticy had to be maintained;
- since many of the benefits accruing from the restoration of budgetary
stabiLity woutd be eroded by the rise in interest rates, ue rould have to
guard against the risk of a snoybaLt effect which wouLd increasingty get out
of hand.
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3. Turning to the question of the urgent need to revive investment,
l'lr Ortoli pointed out that the decline of investment in Europe Has symptomatic
of the retative decLine of Europe as a rhole. The Lack of adequate investment,
notabty in the neu industries, had impaired our capacity for development.
That being so, h,e sere bound to ask rhether ve shoutd expand Community
borrouing operations.
ttlr ortoti thought that we should, but the investnent strategy rras a
comptex matter: it was a strategy for organizing the recovery, the success of
which woutd determine the tevel of investment demand and the shape of the policy
for improving competitiveness.
4. As for the question of re[ying heavi [y on interest subsidies, f,lr Ortoti
dreu attention to the attenclant probIems: choice of beneficiaries, financing,
the response of the market and of interest rates and, above att, the strength
of demand for substantiaL additionat Loans. 0n this tatter point, tttr Ortoti
feLt that there hrere tLro sectors in which there vas undoubtedty some margin
for manoeuvre. These Here the innovating industries and smaLI and mediun-sized
undertakings; there uas atready scope for the development of a tEuropean
inf rastructures pLan' .
5. t'lr Ortoli then considered the probtem of the organization of uork. In
the tight of the situation on the labour market, modern production techniques,
the present organization of industry and the need to produce at reaILy cornpetitiveprices, there ras no reason nhy working hours shoulrl not be reduced.
6. As far as the deveLoping countries were concerned, t4r 0rtoLi indicated
that he uas in favour of continuing to buitd on the achievements of Lom6.
NevertheLess, he uas scepticaI about the Community's abiLity to nake further
significant contributions without support from eLsewhere. A rMarshatL PIan
for the Developing Countries'coutd not be imptemented by Europe aLone. However,
in the tight of the soundings that had been made on the other side of the
AtLantic, the chances of a vast programme of aid being undertaken jointLy by
the industriatized countries seemed someuhat remote.
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He uas arare that there sas,a need for institutionaI reorganization of
the European Communities. But economic recovery had to be seriousty tackted
before this ras complete. He vished to comment on three areas: firstty the
internat European market, secondty the investments needed and thirdLy
reorganization of rorking time. The creation of a genuine European internat
market hras essentiat for economic success. Attention uould have to be given
to the fottoring points:
(a) the obstacles to a free exchange of goods voutd have to be entirety
abo L i shed;
(b) publ,ic r.rlctr roulct h.vc to bc ogcncd uDi
(c) Europc.n 3!.nclards routtl h.vc to bG catabtlshocl to rc9trcc erlsting
n.t{on.t rtendtrds;
(0 to tchlcvo lrcc colgctltlm, r lcArl, frmeyorl for Eurogcrn undcrtrtlnOs
routd h.vc to bc provl<lctl;
(a) the Europcen io6.t.ry systcr toulrl havG to bt strcngthcncd.
taconct gh.3c thc ECU ilr3t btcoit r rcrl rc.n3 of prymnti
ln lt3
(t, tht linrncirt brsir lor grivrtc invcstrnts routd hava to be crceted by
cutbrck3 ln thc Publ,ic 3cctor. ?hc burden on i,\du3try rouLd hrva to be
rectugc6.
Sultrbtc.rcas lor invcstacnt rGre transgort, rcaionat poticy, cncrEy-srvlrrgs
md thr dovologacnt of ncy 3ourc.r of cncrgy. Thc ACp 3t!te3 shoul,d rtso
rcec{ve 3u99ort in this fictd. furthcr sector3 uarc the environacnt, [Gi3ura
lrd houring. Ey rnatogy rith thc principtc of subridiarity, invGstaents
shouttl be nlctc et €urogGtn,teveL if thcy youtd bc oore effective thcra than at
natlonal tevct. rhis rl,so eppticrt, for ?r.rgtG, to the rescrrch 3rctor.
Thc invcclm?nts neccted should not bc oadc via ncr instruncnts but glaccd on
tht !.rkct by arling usc of eristing 3tructurci. HG advocrted tn lncreasc in
thc vatuc-tddao ttr DroDortion of oun-rliourcc3 to 1.4t rnd for grceter usa io
bt iacla ot thc llet Conaunlty InrtrunGnt. ln iti osHbcrrtions, tha ESC had
conc out egrinst an cnGrgy con3unption trr tnd a tar on trts. As rcAards the
rcorglnizrtion oi rorking tirre, hc notao that grouth atonc cout6 not sotvc tha
grobtcm of'unemployacnti iore spccific neasurcs youtd havc to be talcn.
lsee PE 8E.7E9, 21.1.E4
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Thi3, horQvcr, ras trrgcty a fiattcr ?or thc tuo sides ol industry, rhich routct
hava to ncaotiatc seglretcty in the inctividuet 3Gctor3. Neithcr. the stat?
no? thc Conmunity coutt! intGrvcne. Progrcss youtrt bc achievcct by a diatogua
bctrccn thc tro Sides of industry. But it rust ltyay3 be engurrd that thcrs
uas no thFC.t to coipCtitivcncss. GrGater ltcribitity roul,r! bc nlcessary.
Prrt-tino rorl, lor craagtG, coutd bc hrtpful, in this rG3gGGt; mvcrribtc
grogrtnies for young rorlcr3 vho hxt becn cDloycd lor r tong titc youl,d be
coaccivlbtc. The optirur u3r .u3t bG erdc of thc Grilting groduction
uch{ncry. tlrtifc ir AtbG?t, ha suggo?tad thc Coonirrion propos.t for
rcducing rorting tirc. Ho pointcd out that ther? rrs considcrtbtc
controvc?ly rbout reducing rectty rorling timc. tn r finet personat coi.,ant
hc rgrin spotc in favour of the rlrinu; possible tLcriblIity yhcn discussing
thG or9rnit.tloa ol rorking ti!e. Hc bcl,icvcd that th.re uas no tongcr rny
contrrc,{ctlon bctve:n aconoric aad 3ocirt r3pest3, hrt thrt thG3t rGrG
cmvoeglrp.
In reply to questions from various members, Mr ggylgg said that he uas not
ararQ of cooprehtnsive statistics on the possibLe cffect on prices of achieving
unifoil rarlat for 270 r Euro9cln citiecns but th.t thG tr.nstronticr co3tt
rton: h!6 b".n rrtl;atcd rt.n rntult 121000 r ECU. In rccorornce vith the
prinCiplsc ol 3ub3iOiarity, investrcnts shoutct DG ;adc .t tha European icvcI ll
thoy rcrc litcl,y to bc ior'. iucccrtful thcrc th.n at nrtionrt lCvct. Thc
teconO gh.3a ol the Euaogeon lbnctery Systcr rust bc rchicvcd rnd r EurOgrrn
ioneta?, tunc crc.tcd. Thcre uerc 3o.c hogcfut dcvo[oprcnts in this
dlrrction. tt roul,d be crtrercty <tifticult to rllc lo ovcrott corrgrrilon of
profit rrrglns b.rrcen tha USA.nd the Connunity. Errtl rctirtrcnt vor,rttl bc
dangcrous cvcn in thr shoit-terr. givcn tho rnGinent shift 1n Ccacgraohic
tranot. A3 rith othrr socia[ systcrns, thrre nust atrt:rs bc arovision for thc
3y3tat to bc rCv?rsocr. A gancrat introc,uction of tha ECU es I aclns of
Dayitnt could [rad to grcatar non?lrry stabi tity rnd rould thcrcforc bcnefit
tgrlcutturc. Thc rcjection by thc ESC of thr introctuction of r ter on fett
hr6 coac rbout ri thc rasutt of I vcry ctosc votc rith r trrgc nr.rr5er ol
lbttontlons. A potlcy to k.rD r.ge3 doyn u.s nacessary but very ctifficul,t to
iogtcncnt. Thc ESC hect not con3'l6ered the que3tlon of ! t.r on cncrgy\-
inSlortt.
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At the second hearing on 17 January 1984 lvlr Ui!!g1ygg4 began by saying that he
agreed with practicatty the vhole anatysis in the Albert-BaLL report. Heatsoagreed
that investment in proguctive innovatory sectors of industry yas thc major airn
in the ncar future. The changc o'nentatity chich this requirect seenecl to be
sttrting to take pt.cc. The frrst necessity ras eltective unity of thc
Europcan market. Tht Etrropean Ireatics provictcd a basis for this. But ovcr
the'l'tst fe.' years , great many obstactes hed been createct. This .pptisct in
9!rticutai'to the public scctor. The uniforn market youtrt rnake it possibtc
lor European industrr to rp.liatize as needed. In the tictd of {iscat poLicy
the questic'r' arose vhcthcr the Europern Gconomy ncedect tar incentives.
Discussions to dat? had reveated that a distinction shoutd be made betyeen the
lhort-terF end nec,irl'-t?rn aspects. ln the neoium-tcrn there yas Iikel,y to
be a lact ol savings r'icl'. voul,o tead to a lack of disposabte capitat. The
rcasoi, to'thts has thai'.he OPEC surp[uses ot the lasE l,ac noy disaggeared
ano DG?n reDttcecl Uy a 1251000 n cteficit. The current US budget cteficit yas
f200r000 n. Togeth?r trese tuo factors routo tead to a shortage of
disposaole cailtat tnroughovt th€ rortd. The only conctusion to be drayn yas
that tnese def lc'rt3 tust be rcclucccr. ln the short-tern it shcutd bG noted
thtt thcrQ 
-as a shcrt-fal,t in demano dlre to th? crisis. There uere tyo
schcots 91 iirQggi'rt al to strcther demand sho.lLd be stimutateO o;r fiscat
rr?assres, lnrtlat ty ri!h thc rcsutt thet budget clcticits youtct !roro At the
prcrrnr tlrle the European states rerc reducing thcir dcficits yhil,e the USA
uts actuatty crpanding its oeficit. This nright be s?tn rs a xeynesirn tar
incentivc. 6ut in lact it vas not a genuincl,y Xeynesian poticy bccausc it
vts acceOting a perFanGnt dcficit rhich in the tong-tern nust tead to a
Shortage et cap'itat. ine structurat poticy being pursuact in Europe to reduce
deficits rts crtrci?l.y orflicutt to imptenent. The statcs yith a strong
betrncc of trrclc hacl grcrtcr rooit for rranocuvrc in this rcspcct. It youtd bc
golslbtc to provlctt short-tcrn liscrt inccntives. tnyestments coutd be aade
vlr thc Europcan tnvestnent Benk. 8ut vhcthcr this urs r suitabtc instrunent
for investncnt3 on thG scetc of 151000 r ECU res.nother mtter. [ol. yas it ,.f
obvlotre vhether agpropri.tt projects could be founct in thc privltc sector rnd
It vrc speciticttl,y thi3 sGctor rhcrG investrcnts rerc prrticuLlr[y
iportant. ThG idca of subridircd intcrGst ratcs r!3 attractivr.
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Additloml invGstrc^t grogranict shoutd onty triggcr thc devctoprcnt .nd thcn
the rtrkat iust ttkc ovG?. Thcre vrs ruch to be seid for. t.r on olt
{Fortre not [c.3t t3 thic toutd lrintrln thc pr?ssurc to 3!ve rncrEy. Trrct
on h.rllncsr profitr shoul,d bc cut. A dlstlnction shoul,d be nrda in flscat
poLlcy betrecn Cycticrt .nd structurrt eteocnts. In 3tructurat teils, thc
arin rin v.3 to cut gova?nlcnt spcnding. tn the Thirrt lorl.d thc Coaiunity
coutd act .t en edlunct to tha IDA on condition th.t thc .icl gr.nted should be
39cnt in thc Coaaunity. Therc u.s . necd lor potitictl guaran:Gcs to
srleguero benling risl3 lor grojccts in th? Third lortc,.
RepLying to the questions raised by severaL members, t'tr !!!!!!!en drewparticutar attention to the importance of integrating the European capitaL market
and strengthening the Et'tS. The Latter had atready achieved certain successes.
Reducing wage costs was necessary to the extent that the increase in reat uages
stayed beneath the increase in productivity. The idea of a ftuctuating oiL
import Levy was interesting, but the revenue this uroutd yieLd youLd not begredict.bte. Thc ptrnncct aid to investncnt of 15rOOO n ECU, to bG financed
via r to!n, ras on the appropriotc gcatc. 8ut he uas not sure vheth?r the
EIB ras suitrbl,y equiDped. Hc did not havc Goncrete figures on transfers of
cagitrt iron Eurogc to the USA. The US requirencnts in 19t3 yerc |COrOQO n
lnd vcrc tilety to.nount to f80,000 n in 19E6. A tergc part of the capitat
rcqrrirecl camc lron Europc. , lt routd be ertrcnety ctifficutt to discouragt
such crgorts beca.Jte the internationat caoitet nrrkcts rGre ctoscLy inter-
loclcd. lt routcl br trr bettcr to arhs inveltrent ln Euroge tors
att?tctivc. lt ras ingortant th.t thcra shoul,d bc confictence in.3tebta
econorric.nd ilonetary poticy. Atthough it youl,ct bc useful for thcrc to ba
Cornrnission rc9utr!ions on Suoget.ry c,isclgIinc in thc inctiviclurI ieober
Sttie3, thcsc coutct onLy cone rbout in a Unit?6 Stat?s ol Eurogc. Gcneratty
It vas very inport.nt to notG, rs had bccn pointed out tilc and tgein by the
EuroDcan Prrtianrent, th.t counttess qucstions coutd onty nov Dc sctttcd rt the
intcrnrtionaI tevet.
-36- PE 88 .7941f in.lB
Hcaring vith l'lr CARLI (Prcsident of UNICE) 25.1.E4 (FuLt sutnnary in PE EE.900)
nr CARLI stated that UNTCE is in broad agreeoent vith thc anatysil of the
yeakncas of the Europaan cconony contained in the ALBERT-BALL rlgort. ThC
rorsening of the economic position of the Connunity is attributabte to neny
flctors, ilost notab[y the imbatancc Of the majOr,componentS of natiOnaI
inconc and erpencliture, such as the decLine of thc share of gross fircd
invcstrnent,. th! ri sing share of consumotion; the halving in the sharc of
savings,- the increase in thc public sector ano in its dcficit; tha risc in
the sharc of yagcs; and thG tavet of sociat charges. ln adoition, Europcan
industry is hanoicapped by the continued abscncc of a genuine intcrnat raarkct.
Thcse factors are confirned in. recent UNICE study conparing European to
Japancse and American compctitivencss. Untike Europe, ragcs in the USA have
not risen faster than GDP and consequrntty more jobs have becn created. A[so,
tar increascs in Europe havG tEnded to affect firns rathcr than inctividuats(ie. votcrs) nore. ALL these factors have ttndcd to unocrrnine grofitabitity:
thc current transfer of cagitaL to thc USA is due to higher profitebitity thcre
ratner than higher interest rates.
In UNICE's vieH, economic recovery in Europe riLt be brought about more oy
the creation of the right economic environment than by "punp-prining" by the
3tatG. Eusincss activities shouLd be promoted by neasures that coaptenent
narket forces. The transfer of resources to productive activity requires
irngortant mooifications in the structure of pubLic finance. They inctuoe the
recuction of current cxpenditurc, the aLtocation of higher priority to capital
ergenoitur!, approoriate pubtic sector pricing poLicies and the nooification of
lar ttrucrurcs yith a vier to pronoting cornpetititveness tnd cnptoyacnt.
ln perrtLet to such a mcdiun-tcrn financial strategy, othcr nctturGS or.3t
b":skcn io increase cacacity for sustsineo econornic groyth. This rneans, inpar:icutar, thc promotionlof investrnent. Houevcr, thg ALgERT-3ALL oroposal, for
aoc:::cnat auoticty-financco investment programmes equivaLtnt to lZ of GNP,
int:'scucec :y the "backcoor" exceoient of a i50Z incr:ase in Ccnnunity borrcring
so as nor E3 effec: the aLreacy Large nationat ceficits, bcgs a nunoer of cses-
tions: uno rouLs rake uo the lcans? Uhat'rouLd be the inftationarT consecuancss?
ilhat'inoac:'eoul.c such a Iargc toan have on internationat capitat nrrkets? UxICg
acrncrtecgrs Enai increaseo puotic investnent is needcd in sucn er?as as in;:'a-
sir..jEtufrs ano the cevetccment of high technotogy but it must ce caoaotc o;
being financed by econornies in current payments for goods ancl slrvices, inciucinE
..rag3s and srtariss. UNIC: ccLicvcs that neasurcs shoutcl bc tricn to faci ti:ste
srlf-financing by ccnoanics of their oun grivate investment. ihis neans increasinggr:fitaoil,i:y. UNTCE has aovocatro such ilcasure3 as the casing of taxes on cc;t-ganits, grcvisions for tng acccr.eratcd oeoreciation of iixed assctsr t!r r:riei
on liock accrrciations ano erenoiion fron Eaxation of such caoitaI gains as ire
rt-'invcsteo. The costs of sucn proposaLs couLcl be offset by reouctions in:ucLic
ccnsunot i on.
Other neasuras that routd hclp creata e bettcr ccononic environncnt in Europe
voulc be stcos to oc-regutate markct3 for labour, goods, servicrs .nd capita[;
thc:reation of r truty ccmnon rngrket; tha s,;:rengthening of thc EIiS inctuoing tne
cocr:ination of coticy vis-i-vis the ootLar ano the gronotion of thc privat! usr
of:::e ECU rhich snoutd o: givqn the stetus of a conv?rtiote currency; the
!c[?:irvr transfar of ouoLic R and D budgcts to Cornmunity tcvct; aoo the c3,rning
uo:f cuotic secicr contracts. Conccrning tne progosaLs to strcngthen Ccm!::r.nity
lct::n in the encr-cy fietd, UNICS feeIs rhaE rhe impact of this snoutd not s!
ovtr-!stimatcd, ihougn i! endorses rhc Comrnission's June 1965 proposaL. L:stty,
on::':e reorganlsation of ,eorking t'i me, he cecLareo that it ues not oy rortin-:
tcgs inan r ts comcet i tors that 3..rropr r.outct sotve i ts prooterns.
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[earing vith tlr DEBUNNE 25.1.84 (Ful.L sunn.ry in PE EE.90O)
l{r oEBUNNE first issued a vord of varning tbout conparison rith thc usA,
pointing out that the USA differs from Europe in that it has I real connon
market, is a monetary superpouer, possesses a high tevcl of technology thrcugh
its high miLitary rescarch ancj aLtous sociat situations that uoutd bc unacceg-
table in Europe.
ETUC is convinccd of thc nccd for concrGtc n?asur?3 tq 3tioutatt acononic
grouth again. Together vith the European Trade Union Institutc, they carried
out a study based on the 0ECD "Intertink" economic oodel that shouecl that a con-
certed 12 increase in investment of 1Z.of GNP by thc Cornarunity countries uould
create 4 ruiLlion ney jobs uithout causing a significant regression in batancc of
paynenrs or budgetary deficits. He pointed out that investnent in the pubtic
sector a[so creates jobs in the private sQctor both by dircet spin-off rnd by
the muLtiPtier cffect.
Currentty, Cornmunity countries arc tngaged in a spiraL of conpQtitive cuts
in vages and sociaI security, each hooing to improve its position vis-5-vis
the cthers but in fact Leading to an overatt clectine in purchasing porer and
therefore denand in the econony. This vicious circte csuses greatlr uncnotoy-
mcnr and greater budgst deficits. It rnust be broken by a concerted Europtan
sti,lutus to the econony, boosting demand through pubtic investaent. The use of
Ccr:rnuni ty instruments to f inancr investntnt rouLd be vctcome. He recatted
ihat the sost tO natiOnaL exchequers of keeping Eeopte unenrO[Oyec, is cnornous,
acccunring for a targe proportion ot naticnal, bucget oeficits. This should aLso
cnter into any catcuLations about the cos: of ncr investmcnt: tvery ncr job
crr3iec, aLso saves puoLic monOy.
The trace unions suooort t:re introc:-3:ion of ner tichnotogy, but it nust be
carefutLy ptannco in orccr to avoid socicL crises in uhat is aLreaoy a crsastrous
sociaL situation. in tne shor:-run it 't imoossibte to rtouce unenotoyncnt
vi:ncut aLso tar<ing neasures !o snortrn rcrking:'ine pcr oerscn. This snoutcl
be:one in a Euroceln irameyork, settin-e, ior ins:anct, en oricntation oiracEion
fcr a 102 recuction, rhicn rouLo 5e appL'tc ftex:9ty to differ;nt industri:s'
It':tust be ccuoLed Hith measures ensurin: ihat nort Horx?rs ar? lntrcoy ta(en on.
ETUC is not in favour of protectioni:m. Hcycvtr, thty clo fQCL tha! Eurooe
nust resgono to the protectionisn of oth!!'t, notroly the USl, eno to unfair com-petition.
r.rr suooortcC Ene use of orice contr:ts rs a rethod cf comoating inftation.
Ccncrrnrng barrrers tc:he internaL narkl:, hG sL=porteo their gracuaI aootition
ano aooea[ed for narnonized norns at teas: for ggg tecnnotogici eno prooucts.
Fr point:d cut rnat ine most successfuL ::st-wer iurocean ccononics 'rQr? tiosc
rn'-nrch trace unions.rere srrong and rer: closc[y invo[ved in att inportant
eccncmic oecisions, such as Svecen and Austria.
-:Lisjs
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Hearinq uith ltlr LE PoRTZ 26.1.E4 (FutL sun,nary in PE E8.900)
trtr LE PORTZ concentrated his renarks on aspests directLy Linked to the
European Inve5tment Bank and thc Community's Lending instrumcnts, recalting that
ii. Ela yas estabLishcd by the Treaty of Rcme precisety to contributc to batanceo
economic grolth.
Hc fett that thcre are three sectors in uhich investmcnt is vital for econoraic
rtcorery. They are energy, to reducc Euroge's dependence on importcd oit;
industry, to enabte Europe to catch up its tag in advanced indu3tryi end regionat
dcvetopnent to achieve a better balance of activity and enployrnent- lt so happens
that it is in precise[y these areas that ErB and comrnunity lending activities are
concent rated.
Investment through Conrnunity instruments is atso acrvantageous for anothcr
reason. one of ttr. rost imgortant consequences of the devctcpttent of thc conmon
sarket has been the groHing interoepenoence of nationaI econonieS. This has
brought nany benefiti Out, as rhe ALBERT-EALL report itlustrates, it mcans that
any attenpt ar uniLateraL recovery by a ilernber State vitL run up against batance
of paynents constraints. lt is therefore necessary to conccrt econonic poticies
ctoseiy, and to have a mechanisrn of financiaL soLidarity that enabtes veaker
ccononies to deveLop their LeveL of invcstment vithout upsettlng their batance of
paymenrs or boosting infLation: this too is the role of the El8.
Since 1g??, Community borrouing and tending activities have developed ?nor-
aousty. The capitat ot itre E{S rai doubLed trice. -T'ogether vith tnc creation
of the Nev Community Instrunent and the EitlS Loans, this ied to a! increase in
tending handLed ly ine EI3 of somc 252 per year lroa 19?? to 19E3, and thiS ouring
:he eeepest recession;-urcoe has knoun since 1930. In thiS rlspect, lhQ EI3 iS
iii.riy-partLy fuifiLLing ynar yas aovocateo in the AL3ERT-3ALL reeort. lncLuoing
:itiiil lf p"y..nts Loani, some 10.6 bn ECU uere transfcrreo in'19t3'
Thc imoact of such a teveI of toans is imoortant, both ls transfer betreen
Itenoer stares and in ter:.,ls of the econcni c irnoact. The Loans by the EI3 in the
.iiiey srcror (362 of its toans) from i9?? to 19E3 financed groiects that Leo to
a.ui-of the Community's oiL irnoorts by Z1Z. 0ne-third of lretano's road,
cIectricityr,rarer ano teteccmnunications investment came from EI9 financing'
3et.reen 4OO,OOO and 5001000 jobS uere created by EIB investnents in 1983 (rith
the nighcsr numoer per Lnit of invGstment being in smaLL and:nediun-sized under-
:akings).
Can EiB and Comnunity [oans be devcLcped furthcr? tt voutd be di;f':cutt to
increase:nem faster than ihe Z5Z rate of increasc per annun that has been acnie'reo
Cver Itie LaSi Sir yearS, iaking intO aCcount narkGt caoaCitieS and the need to
lnsure nign sterEaros of ouat'ity in projects financeO. Ihe EI3 is aLreacy seccno
OnL, to the t{OrLd Eank in the internationaL markct. NcvertheLeSS, a continuecj
increase at the current rate seems po3sibLe, if carried out rith care'
CacitaI for investmcnt is onty one etement in ccononic recovcry. 0ther
iactors must aLso be present, such as generaL:conomic and financiaL eouitibrium,
ia-ce ri ses comoatibte'ritn the economii sttuation, a sufficient c'egree of seLf-
iiiancing or firrns ano an internationaI inonetary situation chat ooes not c3us€
:xcessive inter?st raies.
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Hearrng ri il'r ilessrs HENDEASoN ano HIGGiNS (0ECO) 26.1.64 (futt summary rn PE 66.yOO)
. ilr HIGGINS presented their introductory remarks. TheT suoscribe to thc
diagnosis of the economic situation sunrnarized in paragraph 4l of the ALBERT-
BALL rs.oort anrj the essentiats of tne anaLysrs of Part I of thc Commission's
Annuat Economic Report for 19E3-E4. Four nain imPeoinents to betttr econooic
gerformanct ean bc identified:
(1) Infl,ation: this has reached nev heights at each peak of the business
cyctc slnce the var, ano is therefore not just due to the oit crises.
It is recognized that in the Long run'inftation is not a trace-oft tor
enptoymcnt, but jeopardizrs economic pcrfornance, creating unemptoynent.
(2) Income shere: uagc and non-rage labour costs havc riscn aorc rapidty
th.n prices, lcading to d?cIinin9 profit shares.
(3) pubLic exoenditures and oeficits: eith affects on initiative, inflation-
ary and "crording out" cffects of pubtlc se€tor borroring, distor!ions
due to the high tevel of taxation. In acdition, pubtic erpenditure has
shifted axay from investncni and touarcis transfer oaymQnts, ano taration
has fatten more on the busin:ss sector (non-vage payroLL costs) than on
the household sector.
(4) nobiIity and responsivencss in markets:
storty to changed circumsiancescus to
ism, rcstrictive practicQs, barriers to
Esropean ccononies respond on[y
rigidities caused by intcrvention-
traie.
these underLying oatadies, rather
on investment, ano investment
',Jeek privata investment is a syngtcm of
than a cause. They reouce excectto rtturn
fatLs.
OECD's current forecasts for Eurcoe in 1984-85 preoict a sLight pickuo in
reaL grovth and a continuing c:ctine in infLation. HoL'ever, unempLoynrent uiLt
contiiuc to risc untiL 1985, r:aching iiZ. Unit labour costs increases riLL
tcveI out and profit shares ar: Iikety io increase. The batance of paynrents
surcLus ritt gron. Government borroring nltL be Lower, HcvevQr, a comoarison
.rith other zoncs of the OECD inoicates ihat the recovery is sern as ueakes! in
Eur ope.
ilost European governments are aLready beginning to foLtov the necessary
goLicy guidetines, but these must be ccntinuec ccnsistentty. Actditionat
neasures shouLd addresss the uncerLyin3 prooLeas anci not be patLiatives: they
are rather sceoricaL of the AL3iRT-3AL!- atan (caragrapn 52) to ooost pubLie
invest;lent funced by borrowinc, noi 5e::use it'.ioutd not oe a viabLe project in
itSeLf ?r that thcre youtO not Ce enou:n Cutte:5, rnicn ihere uouLd ce, Out
because the ioea does not ccme tc grics'ritr funoamentaLs. They'rarned ihat it
is necsssary for goLicies to iiave a nigh ce-cr:e of consensus if they are tc
.dor(, vhich requires that the ccsis o; cnange 3e shared equitaoty ano that ihe
"safety nct" of the veLfare statE ce m5'intaineC-
The ttay 1983 OECD Minister'iaL mee:ing hac identifieo thre! categories of
econcmias: Strong, conva[escir.g 3no.€5k.'itthough they hao fett there vas
scme rccn for the stronger eccrcnies t: ne[c::'le others oy re[aring their
ioLicies, he uarneo that rhe usuaL nis:ake cf gcvernments at tnis point in the
business-Cyc[e uas to be too rtl.ixec. On the "tnterIink" eccnonic noce[, it'
Eointec out that this hao been'inccrr:::ty in.roked earLier in tne Hearing rith
itlr DE3UliNE. oECD reSuIss rer: ci rf er:nt f rca aTUC's. In any case, any
rnodeL snouLd be used,.lith caut'i cn as ii':ey are 
=ased on tne average of past
ecor':cni c res;onses 'rhr ci may :e'Je cnangeo.
xr HENDERSON srated that they ',rere in broad agreetnent ui th the TLEERT-gALL
recort vhere'it Sooke of the neeo for a genuine[y unifieo European market and
abgut governments' over-enonasiS On the SrOrt iSrn in aconcmic OOIiCy' Honever'
tney feti ihat the reoort uaS too ceSs'inristic cn the poSitiOn of europe in the
aeoruin-tsri:1, too Opt'imiStic about the eifectS Oi "pumg-prinin9" and too
"Cot::ertiste" 
- 
/.n 
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Hcaring yith f.lr uRI 26.1.84 (FuLt sunmary in PE EE.gOO)
ttr URI concentrated his rernarks on chattenging a nurnber of assunptions and
rnyths. Hc pointed out that gglyatg investnent depcnds on expected votuoes of
satcs uhich cepends on consumgtion not being cut. Consumption and investment
are not zero-sun trace-offs rhen there is unused capacity in the economy. The
USA has not compressed consungtion. tg!!j,S investrnent, on the other hano,
shoutd not look at short-term profitabiLity but at mediua-tern bcnefits to the
eccnony. The aims of the nationatizecj sector in France is to do this, in the
same yay that Japanese conpanies do not go for short-tera profits but rnakc
ncdium-term ptans together uith ltlITI
0n the proposed oit tar or [evy, Ilr URI fett that this rouLd be uscful as a
source of rcvenue for investment and as a cjisincentive to uastt encrgy. If it
uas to take the form of an imoort tax, this rrouLd contributc to sotving the dis-
equitibrium in the UK contribution to the Conmunityr though to sotve that problea
by itseLf it voutd have to be a very high tevy-
f{r URI insistei on the negd to ex=Loit the Community dimcnsion. The fietd
of rgsearch is insiructive: ihe hoped-for joint atonic energy rescarch foreseen
in Euratom never took off as cach coun-Lry hoped that it voutd nake a breakthrough.
The resu[t is that ue noH att buy American-cesigned nuctear pouer stations.
This nust not happen again: the Treaties atLou possibitities for joint research
if there is poLiticat eitl..
The US economic recoveryt,to? the first time, is not spreaciing to thc rcst
of thc yor[o. This is partly due to th.ir high interest rates sucking auch-
neec=d caoitat auay f rorn Europe anci the Thi rd ',lortd, a probten rith Long-term
consSquences.
i{r URt said that the vay to Cevetc= emotoyrnent rhite cutting inftation is to
ccncgntrare cn the CeveIooment of Hhat ihe:conomist, ED0UARD, caLIs "narginaIjobs". He also catted for a strengthening of the institutionat framevork of the
Connunity to increase its capacity to aci.
t{r URt pointed cut that profitabiLity is not thc onty incentive for grorrth
ano invesrnent: the;rench nationatized sector had a higher then.veragG grouth
in i!.ccuctivity, yniLc making tosses du! to the hotding doun of thcir priccs by
inf Lrt ion-f i 3nt i ng gcyernments.
Cn tara:ion, he:ointeo cut tnat, e.s it is proving difficult to cut the overaIt
LeveL cf:ax, g'iven tne Iarge oudger oeiicits, any suoorrssion of a gariicuLar t3r
rout= have t, oe reotaceo oy another tex. ProgosaLs to exempt prcfits frcrn taxes
shouL= oear':nis in mind. Hcrever, he ieLt that re-invested profits shouLd be
tarr: Less rian distributed profits.
i{e drer atten'ticn to the nyth that sociaI
rieig:ing on i:ie whote European economy: it is
but::iere niLitary sp3nding -:ouatty a surden
cec::es, ine:ost suc:ttssfuL e:cnomies rere the
r.evets of s:c'i aL securi ty.
security charges are a burden
true that they are louer in the USA
- is much higher. For several
Scancinavian ones, uith very high
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1. Mr LANTZKE deatt trith the main aspects of the ALbert and Batt report,
agreeing vith their ana[ysis. He dea[t rith the prob[em of the current
economic recovery uhich was evident in the Levet of consumption but not yetin the tevet of investment: an important reason for this uras the so-catLedtnon-Europet. Hotever, it was not the onty reason, the other fundamentaI
one being the tack of investment in the recent pasi caused in part by touprof i t s.
There yere three principaI areas of
i nvestment s :
- the urgent need to overcome a certain
chaItenge of new technoLogies;
a,ction to stimutate a recovery in
passivity in Europe through the
- the need for Europe to make a great teap forward to catch up,.lith theUnited States and Japan;
- the importance of giving far greater consideration to the probtem of theunified European industriaL area.
There were however certainty in the ALbert and BaLI report areas of
excessive pessimism about the possibiLity of a further depression in the ggs,
rhereas the speaker fett that there t.lere prospects of grouth, aLbeit Iimited.Hotrever, rJe had to get out of the vicious circte in whjch a weak economic
situation prevented investment; the means for doing so bJere at hand: inflation
under controt, a net'l approach by both sides of industry, and pubtic sectordeficits which were graduaLty coming under controt.
2. 0n the question of energy, Mr Lantzke said that the states of Europehad to provide ctear norms and standards in this sector and pursue a policy
which left room for managers to manage. He pointed to the effectiveness of
energy-saving measures and measures to use community resources.
The idea of a tax on oiI imports h,as not very practical, he fe[t, sinceit uas not justifiabte in terms of a fal.L in uor[i prices: tiris tax youLd
simpty ueaken the competitive position of European industry. It was atsopoLiticatLy difficult to find an agreement on such a tax; LastLy it coutd
create a distortion in imports of other energy products.
He vas sceptical about the idea of a HarshatL pLan for energy for the
countries of the Third t,lortd since not aLt of those countries hal-thepotentiaI to respond to the stimutus of massive investment. This tras true
even for many countries in the Lom6 Ccnvention.
3- Europe, Mr Lantzke concLuded, had the resources and the economic andtechnicaI means to etiminate the negative effects of energy probtems on its
economy; it did, however, have to lay down a framework foi activities in thissector and take energy probtems into account in aLL decisions, reviewing the
concepts of security of suppties, deaLing with the problem of radioactiveh,aste and, Lastty, devetoping the energy savings poLicy to prevent theuntikety but not impossible eventuaIity of a ttrird oi t crisis.
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4. Ansuering the questions put by certain members, Mr Lantzke pointed out
that the destination of the revenue from the oit tax uas inftuenced bypotitical problems and that there hras a danger that it woutd be prinarity
prestige projects yhich wou[d be financed. Furthermore, the various European
countries uoutd tend to encourage investments which might even conftict rrith
one another.
As regards priorities for investments in the energy sector, he took the
vieH that the soft energy sector should be encouraged, but rrithout harbbuning
any itlusions that this cou[d reptace traditionat sources; furthermore, rhat
uas needed uas not so much major programmes to support energy savings, but
much more information.
He was certain that a third oiI crisis vould lead to a serious depression:
to prevent this, there woutd havc to be a more effective policy on stocks.
Hr Lantzke conctuded that only an excessive fatL in oit prices couldjustify a variabIe levy.
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1. The Vice-President of the Commission, ttlr DAVIGN0N, strcssed the need to
increase Europers investment capacity in the energy sector, vhich was very Lou
in conparison vith Japan and the United States. The same ras true for invest-
ments in manufacturing industry, nhich vere not at present principat[y directed
touards new products.
The difficulties in investing in Europe lay in Lou profitabitity, in the
Lack of a true common market, rhere the European dimension is a fundamental
factor in profitabitity, in the lack of incentives for industriaI cooperation
in Europe, and in the ineffectiveness of reguIations on inteLtectuaL property
in a number of sectors.
A different problem arose in the tetecommunications sector, in vhich the
encouragement for investment rouLd come primarity from the creation of standard
norms, rather than from pubLic investment or promotion of research. 0n the
other hand, research and investnent uere essentiat in a sector such as transport
and biotechnotogy. fut investment in the sectors of ney technotogy ras hampered
by reaknesses in the areas of information, research and regulations.
2. 0n financial problems, [tlr Davignon spoke of the need to create stabte
sources of finance for muLtiannual programnes: the Community ras not geared up
to this approach.
He atso maintained that Community aid took the form of subsidies to
Member States rather than genuine measures aimed at achieving Comnrunity ends: to
reverse this situation, programnes with wetL-defined priorities youtd hav! to
be Laid doyn.
3. Answering the many questions put by members, ttlr DAVIGNON said that the
ueaker countrics couLd benefit from a recovery in the stronger countries. He
said that Europe had to maintain a certain levet of production even in the [ess
advanced sectors.
He added that to deat uith the crisis ne would have to ensure that the
differences betveen the Member States did not prevent them from taking common
measures. There yas also a need for specific initiaL encouragenent for a recoveryin investnent, because profitabitity in Europe yas at present Lotr; but there rtas
no escaping the need to create more favourabLe narket conditions.
There ras then a need to identify sectors where investment ras essentiat
and to preserve devetopment capacity, bearing in mind that simpty acquiring
patents did not automaticaILy confer deveLopment capacity.
He vas opposcd to a tax on oiL products, even a flexible one.
RepLying to a specific question, lilr DAVIGNoN said that permanent interest
subsidies or even a rninority sharehotding in conpanies by the Community uere
impracticabLe.
LastLy, l,lr Davignon pointed out that the essentiat prerequisites for
recovery uere: creation of an effective internat market and a Community industriaL
atea, more tenient taxation on concentrations at Eurogean teveL, new incentives to
investors, and the launching of measures in the research sector.
?E 8E.794lfin-lB-44-
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40. The nembers of the committee broadly agreed on the content of the ptan
for European economic recovery and, in particutar, on the need to consolidate
the common narket, strengthen thc Ef{S, integrate the capitaI narket and
evoLve appropriate industriat and research strategies. They recognized the
need to avoid refuetting inftation, to bring thc econonic poticies ctoser
together and to pursue internationat consuttations yith Europets partners
outside the Community. [t|ost Here in favour of maintaining a generous
progranme of aid forthe countries of the Third tlorLd, in Line yith the
principIes estabIished by the European ParIianrent. As for their differences,
they tended to side either uith Flr Atbert or ilr 8at[, but yere tess amenabte
to compromise.
- Some members insisted on the necd for energet.ic measures to revive
domestic demand by means of pubLic investnent schemes financed both fron
Community loans and from the nationat budgets of those countries rhich "
had succeeded in redressing the macroeconomic imbatances. They rere in
favour of incomes moderation to the extent that increases in purchasing
poirer or rrages shoutd not outstrip productivity gains. They atso
favoured the subsidization of interest rates as an incentive to
investment in the priority sectors. Last[y, they favoured a fIexibl.e
industriaL poticy, planned and supervised by the pubtic authorities,
an immediate and substantiaI reduction in rorking hours ]rithout any
Loss of purchasing pouer, and retention of atL the benefits of thc
Uetfare State.
- At the other extreme, there were those members uho maintained that
priority shouLd be given to restoring the profitabiLity of investment
by depressing reaI rage costs and reducing fiscaL and parafiscaL charges.
It uas the duty of the pubLic authorities to make every,effort to
stabitize exchange rates, bring dorn inftation, reduce the budget
deficits, e[iminate the barriers to freedon of movenent for goods,
persons and capitaL, and cut back velfare expenditure. ilarket forces
could be retied upon to do the rest. They nonethetess recognized the
need for a major comnunity programme to foster research in the nen
technotogies.
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Betveen these tno reIative[y cLear-cut positions stood those rho advocated
a recovery programme based soteLy on the revivaI of private investment
and using interest subsidies, those yho favoured reviving consumption and
investment grorth through cuts in taxation, and those nho hetd that
priority shou[d be given to improving our export performance through
subsidized financing or the [ouering of exchange rates.
IV. IES-YIE!!-9E-I!g-BABE9BIEUB
41. blhite subscribing to atmost every point in the diagnostic section
of the ALbert/BatI report, particuLarLy trhere it discusses the macroecononic
disequiLibria betueen investment and consumption, the substantiaL size of
the pubLic tevies, the rigidity of the factor attocation nechanisns, the
conpartmentaLization of the markets, the cost of sociaI yeLfare provisions
and the lack of sotidarity and convergence at European LeveL, your
repporteur nould have been atL the more pteased if the section presenting
the authorsr separate or agreed sotutions had been equatLy specific and
comprehensive. tihite this section undoubtedLy addresses itseLf to some of
the most cruciaI issues, it negLects many of the questions raised in the
diagnosis.
Is recovery necessary and, if so, rhat form shouLd it take?
If it is intended that rrecovery' should be based on a rapid aad
substantiat increase in pubtic investment demand - or private or pubtic
consumption demand - then ue are being asked to accept a Keynesian-type
poticy, which certain[y cannot provide a suitabLe remedy to the present
economic situation in Europe.
The reasons for this are Legion.
(a) lrle must first of atl. dismiss the idea that recovery can be achieved
on a purety nationaL basis. The poLicies tried by the British
Government in 1976-77 and by the French Government in 1975-76 and
1981-82 did nothing but rekindte inftation and very rapidty Led to
baIance of payments and exchange rate difficuLties.
Some commentators have pointed out that these poticies wou[d never-
thetess have been effective i f the externaL constraints couLd have been
eIiminated either by abandoning fixed exchange rates or by introducing
a measure of protectionism - or if they had been coordinated at European
teve[' 
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(c)
However, these same commentators convenientty ignore the infLation
factor, forget that the experience uith ftoating exchpnge rates has
not yet produced conctusive results and seem to be unauare that a
return to protectionism wouLd be a disaster for Europe.
That leaves us rith the idea of a concerted and non-infLationary
European recovery.
(b) Assuming that the trlember States governments agreed on this type of
recovery and assuming - in the absence of a singLe European currency
- that increases in trade betueen the Member States vere such that
additionaI imports ]rere exact[y offset by additionat exports, thus
leaving their trade balances unchanged, then the imports conponent
of GNP uoutd be reduced tron 25/ to 12-51. Horever, the externaL
constraint on our economies rouLd not disappear, and since Europe is
without an internationaL reserve currency instrument of its oun, it
coutd not afford to dispense Hith the mechanisms needed to redress its
batance of payments in reLation to the rest of the worLd.
Let us go further and assume that the probtem has been.sotved or eLse
does not arise. It cannot be claimed with certainty that an increase
in demand uoutd result in a high tevet of sustained grouth, so long as
the structurat impediments to grouth identified in the ALbert/BatI
diagnosis have not been eradicated. A relaxation of hri;etaty o? nmetary
CiscipLine miEht procluce a Erout;l rate in reaL t..rns of the orcier of 2
or 3/.0 but the onty other resutt woutd be an upturn in infation. l,lhy?
Let us suppose for a moment that there is no energy problem. Even a
very modest recovery of gronth woutd reactivate demand for oiI products,
but ve vould assume that suppLy could easi[y meet such demand and that
the exptosive potiticaI situation in the i4iddle East troutd for the tirne
being have no effect on the oiL-exporting capacity of the Gul.f States.
Grorth in Europe is impeded by two factors : the Eround Lost in tech-
noLogicaL development, and the structuraL rigidities, which both prevent
the optimum attocation of the factors of production, thereby detracting
from the competitiveness of European industry, and inhibit productive
investment in the private sector,
(d)
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(e) Itluch has already been said about the technology gap. t{e are no longer
ashamed to admit the error ofour uays. IndeEd" the etectronics and
cottrputer industries in Europe have themsetves sounded the alarm.
Atthough it nould be mistaken to beLieve that tha adoption and imptem-
entation of the Esprit programme uould enabte us rapidLy to make up
thc considerabte ground [ost, it is frustrating and disappointing to
note that, even as these lines are being penned, thc CounciL stiil.
hesitates to give the green Light for reasons of budgetary austerity.
Be that as it nay, any increase in demand in Europe voutd et present
resu[t in a disproportionate increase in inports of the grorth
technotogies and have no positive impact on emptoyment.
0n the contrary, it vould aggravate the empLoyment situation inasmuch
as the imported technotogy you[d be tlabour-saving'.
As for the structuraL rigidities, these arise from the compartnentaL-
ization of the markets resutting from the persistence of technicaL
(or non-tariff) barriers to trade, the high Levet and infLexibiLity of
uage costs, the excessive cost of the tietfare state, and the ptethora
of bureaucratic ruIes and regutations.
The rapporteur, who has read countLess studies of the probtems outtined
1
above', has found no better resum5 of the matter in hand than the
concLusions reached by the Giersch and tdoLter team of the Institut fUr
t'lettwirtschaft, Universitgt Kiet, in its articte'Torards an expIanation
of the productivity sLotrdoun', pub[ished in volume 93 of the Economic
Journat (llarch 19E3). These concLusions, uhich are reproduced betor,
are the outcome of an exhaustive and extremety wett-docutrented study,
vhich ue uoutd commend to the reader.
The high leveL of growth of the 1960s coutd not be sustained for the
foLIoning reasons :
1. Straightforward quantitative groHth was bound to fatI into disrepute
after it had raised generaL uetfare in some fietds and coutd no
Longer hide its deficiencies and costs in other fieLds; what the
pubtic IegitimateLy demanded after a period of fast quantitative
grouth h,as a new pub[ic aood catLedrquaLitative grotrthr.
(f)
(g)
' See bibLiographicaL annex
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?. For Europe and Japan, opportunities for the econonic exptoitation of
technotogicaL innovationsn especiit[y those oriEinatinE in thc United
States, were finite.
3. Export-Led grovth in Europe and Japan had conc to an cnd as it vas
based on an overvaluation of the dotlar and American rcsources.
'4. Supplies of many materiats vere linited and had to becon: tess
etastic at given relative prices in the fietds of energy, exhaustibte
resources and - for Europe - skitted nanpouer.
5. Accelerating inftation, due to fine tuning and the fact that
decl,ining supp[y e[astic'ities uere accommodatcd by monctary poticy
rather than Hage poticy, had to be stopped at some point by rigorous
deftationary measures, uhich in turn inhibited grouth.
(h) Etements of mutuaI causation vhich had positivety affected the acce[-
eration process turned negative.
1. uhiLe straightforuard quantitative grouth - rith sca[e economies
and minor changes in reLative prices - had boosted investors' confid-
ence, quatitative grorth - requiring more structuraI adJustnent in
response to greater changes in retative prices - made business
uncertain and pessinistic.
Z. After fast productivity advance had enabLed a fast increase in rea[
xa6ps witho;t inpairing enptoyrnnt mortrnities, organized t*oJr hel.d extr4oLatirg
(or adaptirr) tr4e expectatius Hhen the trasitirr to qrl.itati\ie gr€Eth ocrurrcd.
Insted of accqtrpdatirp the greater inrestnrnt rncertairty, oryrrized t*oJr in Larga parts
of Europe rejected taliing into account the sharp deterioration of
its fuLI empLoyment (or equiLibrium) terms of trade vis-6-vis encrgy
and the naturaI environment and started a fiercer struggte over the
income distribution, rhich treakened the sociaI consensus, induced
governments to embark upon populist reform poticies, strengthened
protectionist attitudes, and Led to more unemptoyment or to a tolrer
productivity advance and possibLy to both.
3. uthi[e nonetary acceleration ptus adaptive expectations on financiat
markets had kept real rates of interest in check during thc 1960s
and nhiLe it heLped once more rhen it was used again to acconnodate
the higher [eve[ of energy prices after 1974175, a stop of monetary
acceleration was bound to raise the reat rate of interest to its
Long run equitibrium leveL, perhaps uith some overshooting; and a
monetary deceleration to bring dorn inftation rates finatty produced
the exotic reat rates of interest ue had in the recent past.
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(i) The articte ends yith the foltouing recommendations :
'At to conditions on thc tabour arrlet that voutd bring ur brct to rrtisftctory
lcvetr of enptoycQnt, vG G.n 3t.tr : if r norn for reet rege lircrersct in thc
futurc tGrc to becstabl,ishcd on thc besis of prst trends, the rcesured incrcrsc
of trbour produetivity in the besc aeriod EU3t mt onty be cor?Gctrd for
changes in the tcrns of trade and ia thr costs of other inputse lt lrst etso be
corrccted for changes in enptoyocn:. Thc equitibriun productivity edvrncc,
i-c. thc tdvencc consisttnt vith ccnstlnt cnptoyrent, aust bc i,Jdgd to have
becn touer (highcr) th.n Ehat is ae:uatty neasured if earptoyrent hes fal,ten
under the pressure of crccssive ueg! costs (if rages have becn ttgging behinrd
thc grorth of distributabte output). lf the t.rget for thc firture is not const.at
enptoyoent but rising eaptoyaent, the uage norn has to be further rcdr.rced
by a eargin vhosa size vitl depcnd upon thc speed at yhich ergtoyrcnt is to
be increasad. A tevel of aaitoynen: vhich vas too toy for too Long r tiag is
I'ikcty to hlve gencratcd rage induc:d cepitrl obsotescence and e co6drponding
iob gap. In order to ctost this g=: a tong rnd strong teg of rerl uages behind
Productivity advanct nay be necessrry for sufficicntl,y boosting grofit crpect.-
tionsr Prrofits, and investacnt. tJags restraint rtso has the ftnctiqr of lccoa-
nodrtinE thc high reat rates of in:rrest rhich lrc required for rtiring the
propensity to s.ve and for inducing invcstors to change thcir technotogicat bias
froa trbour-saving to capiiat-saving methods of production.
An accetcr.tion of investcent in pLcnt and equipncnt (proooted bl torcr
Yagc costs), a bGtter rttocation of this investnent, and r aore clficicnt usc of
the eristing stock of cepitat (cnfcrccd by rctativety high reet rttcs of intcrest)
vould in coobination gradual,ty ctcs: the structurat job gap.8, reising the
ocCiuo run tevcl of enploytrent, this y6u16 reduce resistancc egtinst arptoi-
ting thQ gains froa specirtisation, frccr trade, end faster tcchnicet progress, rnd
pevc thc vay for a !or? rapid ;soductivity ldvancc, faster vtgc increases
rt givan tevets of enptoyn?nt, anc t reneved sociat consrnsus, perhaps uith
lcss reliancc on cottectiv! ec:ior:. 3ut the grocess cf transitioa r.r be tough,
con9artbL? to rhat the vortd crger':nced hrl,f r century ago. The eethersis
couto be faciIitatcd by :
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an intetlrctuet sgnslnsus on thc fundanenttt distortions that hevc to bc
cor rectcd,
institutionat chenges in thc labour rertet to sstt rege bchtviour norc
resPonsivc to unetPtoyosnt,
r rsnovlt of barricrt to entry for ncv firre rnd entrcprcncsrirl tttcnts,
.nd,
- cfforts tc rcducc unccrtrinty in the rctrtionship betvecn govcrntcnts and
nrkctg.
ltcrsures to boost demnd nay bc ncccssary shoutd nrtrlet confidcnca cottapse in
a criticat phase, but outual confidence end confidenca in govcrntcnt can bc
best trusted to revivc and to induce a sustainab[c crpansion of cffectivc
daoand, in conpliancc yith a rencucd grorth of factor productivitics rnd
.ggrcgate suppty, if relativc frctor pricas reftcct rctative factor scarciti?3.'
(j) Although, in any recovery p[an, the accent must above atL be ptaced on
measures to etiminate the obstacLes to grorth, there is a danger that,
untess those measures are sufficientIy botstered by export demand
(yhich is at present the case in the US economic recovery, atthough
there is no certainty that it riIL Last) and by investment demand from
the private sector, the resutting deftationary effect riLL be more
tasting than is desirable. This is why the recovery plan must aim
first to reduce the cost of capitaL to investors and then to ease the
fiscaL pressure on personaL.incomes and the parafiscat pressure on
wage incomes, so as to increase the amount of income avai Labte for
saving and consumption trithout pushing up production costs.
Any other recovery ptan - especiaL[y one which retied on a nassive
expansion of publ.ic investment or pubLic consumption - uouLd have
the disadvantage of reducing stitt further the aIready unacceptabty
snatt share of the private sector and of increasing the atready
excessive indebtedness of counttess pubtic authorities or, if the
noney stock uere too targe, of rekindLing inflation.
(k) why is it that, hrith the same groHth rate in the United States and
Europe, there is such a pronounced difference in their abitity to
create jobs?
The answer to this question is twofotd.
)
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The retative price ratio as betueen the labour factor and the capitat
factor, vhich has been much higher in Europe than in the United States,
has prompted industry to give precedence to capita[-intensive investment
and tabour-saving investnent.
(t) This trend has been further exacerbated by a detiberate policy of
subsidizing investment by reducing interest rates or awarding capitaI
grants, rith the resuLt that GNP grorth rates have been further
dissociated from empLoyment grorth rates.
There can be no doubt that the reversal of the relative factor cost
trend (currentLy taking place) and the greater emphasis nou being pLaced
on the rquatityr rather than the'quantityrof grorth viLI in the tong
run be more conducive to thc creation of jobs. This is iLtustrated by
the considerabte expansion of enptoyment in the tertiary sector in the
USA.
(m) The second significant factor is the difference in the Level of ftex-
ibiLity of the tabour market and in the amount of sociat security
avaitabte to uorkers. Periods of unemployment in the USA are on
average six times shorter than in Europe (1 nonth as opposed to 6
months), and hatf the unemployed in America receive no benefits of
any kind.
The co-existence of a high tevel of unemptoyment and a scarcity of
certain kinds of labour is a very rare phenornenon in the Unitod States.
The most important reason for this is the degrce of fLexibitity rhich
characterizes reaL Hages as uetL as uorking hours. It is not surpnising
that the most spectacular grouth in emptoynent has taken place in the
service sectors, in which rorking houFs are morc ftexibte, part-time
uorking is more common and the Hages spread is greater than in any
other sector.
(n) It is equaLty striking to note that the ner desire for'quatitativer
gronth has resutted in Europe in a substantial increase in the demand
for pubtic services (heatth, cutture, security, [eisure) and, con-
comitantty, an increase in the number of pubtic officiats and a rise
in taxation, since many of these services are provided or so[d at
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(o)
betou-cost prices. In the United States, on the othcr hand, this
same grouth in demand is addressed to the market, vhich has rcspondcd
ftexibLy and efficientty. There is no doubt that nrarket-oricntated
grouth of this kind ri[[ cone up against fiscal and burcaucratic
constraints and the poor at[ocation of resources vhi.ch often ste,ns
f nom-such cofts-tr€i.nts .[ess quickty t-han thc'type of grovth-seen in-
Europe.
Until. the adjustments nor in hand have the desired effect, the
recovery of grorth ri[[ not be accompanied by a cut-back in the tevet
of unemployment. Hence the need for back-up measures.
Unless it allows of a measure of fLexibility and compromise in the
interests of maintaining the conpetitiveness of undertakings and
financing investment, the principaI dernand of the trade union
organizations in this area - an unconditionat reduction in uorking
hours - could uelt be as disastrous for the grouth of employment.as
the maintenance of indexing or the increase in rrages yhich fottowed
the first oit shock.
(p) Atthough MicheI Atbert's proposats are ptausible and reasonabte, they
presuppose that peopLe in emptoyment uiIt accept the trade-off between
income and leisure, or wiLl. be prepared to make considerab[e sacrifices
to hetp those vho have no empLoyment. This is a risky assunption and
ue can understand why ttlr BaLI shoutd exprcss scepticisnr. Your
rapporteur takes a tess pessimistic viey, but he has no faith in
generaI formulas imposed from on high.
(q) Your rapporteur is incLined to place his trust in the effectiveness
of negotiations trhich take place as ctose as possibte to thr shop
ftoor. He is atso in favour of fisca[ or administrative inccntives
being nade avaitabl.e to a[[ undertakings rhich venture to test ner
rays of adjusting or reducing working hours, uith the exprcss proviso
that such experincnts do not result in an escatation of production
cost s.
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